Here at TAR we rarely highlight ancient philosophy, but every generalisation
is made to be broken.
The surviving sources on the Stoic theory of division reveal that the
Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, believed that bodies, places and times were
such that all of their parts themselves had proper parts. That is, bodies,
places and times were composed of gunk. This realisation helps solve
some long-standing puzzles about the Stoic theory of mixture and the Stoic
attitude to the present.
Here are some other papers that you might like to have a look at.
In this paper, I shall first outline a version of epistemological
contextualism. I shall present this version of contextualism as a contextualist
account of terms like ‘justified belief’, rather than terms like ‘knowledge’.
(If justification is a necessary condition for knowledge, this contextualist
account of ‘justified belief’ would naturally lead to a parallel
contextualist account of ‘knowledge’; but I shall not address
the question of whether justification is necessary for knowledge here.)
Unlike most contextualists, I do not claim that my version of contextualism
will help to solve any challenging sceptical paradoxes; but I shall
argue that this version of contextualism can nonetheless shed light
on some other epistemological issues, focusing especially on an issue
that arises about the justification of moral beliefs.
Previous theories of the relationship
between dispositions and conditionals are unable to account for the fact that
dispositions come in degrees. We propose a fix for this problem that has the
added benefit of avoiding the classic problems of finks and masks.
We introduce a dilemma that
faces any analysis of dispositional ascriptions in terms of subjunctive
conditionals. However carefully the relevant conditionals are formulated,
the analysis will founder either on the problem of accidental closeness
or on the problem of Achilles’ heels. The dilemma arises even for
sophisticated versions of the conditional analysis that are designed to
avoid the familiar problems of finks and masks. We conclude by evaluating
the prospects for an analysis and offering a proposal of our own.
Thanks to the editors for asking me to reply to P.M.S. Hacker’s
review of my Philosophical
Analysis in the Twentieth Century. I begin with his complaint about the
materials I chose to
“In its selection of materials it is unrepresentative: significant
figures are omitted and
pivotal works are not discussed… the book is less a history
of analytic philosophy than
a series of critical essays on select figures and a few of their
works, often chosen
primarily to substantiate a thesis that is erroneous.”
Since no erroneous theses leading to indefensible choices about what material
to include are
identified, I will try to tease this out as we go.