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February 28th, 2008

Kripkenstein’s Mules

I’ve been thinking recently about the possible fruitfulness of comparing cleverly-disguised-mule-worries (CDMW) in epistemology with Kripkensteinian-meaning-underdetermination-worries (KMUW).

I think it is helpful, in understanding CDMW, to think about two kinds of questions:

(1) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than lions?
(2) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than cleverly disguised mules?

‘Because they are zebras’ looks like a good answer to questions like (1) and a bad answer to questions like (2).

For a contextualist explanationist about knowledge like myself, this suggests that in contexts where the question ‘Is S’s belief explained by the fact believed?’ amounts to something like (1), ‘S knows they are zebras’ looks good, and in contexts where that question amounts to something like (2), ‘S knows they are zebras’ looks bad.

What I find suggestive, in trying to understand KMUW, is an analogy with the questions:

(1’) Why does S use ‘plus’ for addition rather than subtraction?
(2’) Why does S ‘plus’ for addition rather than quaddition?

‘Because of the dubbing, or otherwise word-defining, activities of S’s linguistic predecessors’ looks like a good answer to questions like (1’) and a bad answer to questions like (2’).

More on this topic will follow …

Posted by Carrie Jenkins in Uncategorized

This entry was posted on Thursday, February 28th, 2008 at 9:18 am and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the comments RSS 2.0 feed. You can skip to the end and leave a response. Pinging is currently not allowed.

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