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May 15th, 2008

What is a Gettier Case?

The phrase “Gettier Case” is used with (at least) three different meanings that I’ve noticed.

First, it is sometimes used to refer to cases where S derives a true conclusion p from a false premise q. This is obviously true of the original cases in Gettier’s paper. Since the meanings are strictly weaker as we continue through the list, this isn’t a unique property of this interpretation.

Second, it is sometimes used to refer to cases where S forms a true, and justified, belief, but where the reasons it is true, and the reasons it is justified, are entirely different. Williamson’s binocular vision case is like this. S has one reliable eye, and one unreliable eye. S forms the belief that p on the basis of the input from his unreliable eye, although at the same time his reliable eye also forms the representation that p. Arguably this is justified (at least S has evidence for p), but it isn’t knowledge.

Third, it is sometimes used to refer to any justified true belief that isn’t knowledge.

Since this is basically a technical term, it would be good to have some standardisation of the meaning. And it would be good to standardise on the most epistemological significant of the categories. (In my opinion, that’s the second one, but that could be wrong.) Does anyone have a suggestion for this?

Posted by Brian Weatherson in Uncategorized

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3 Responses to “What is a Gettier Case?”

  1. clayton says:

    There’s something problematic about the second account. It seems that a Gettier case cannot be a case of knowledge, but it’s not obvious (to me) that it is impossible for there to be a case in which S forms a true, and justified, belief, but where the reasons it is true, and the reasons it is justified, are entirely different where S also knows p. The cases are controversial, but I’m thinking of cases of knowledge derived from falsehood. Similar worries arise for the first.

    I’d be happiest with the third, but there’s just one more wrinkle. There are some views on which a justified belief just is knowledge. I have in mind Sutton’s view and although some people don’t like to own up to this, it seems some people’s views concerning warranted assertion commit them to this view. As tempting as it might be to say such views are committed to the impossibility of Gettier cases, advocates of such views can say pretty much what the rest of us want to say about such cases. They can say a subject is justified in believing p, p is true, but the belief that p is not justified as it fails to constitute knowledge (drawing on Bach and Engel’s distinction between personal and doxastic justification). They can say as Sutton does that the belief in Gettier cases is reasonable but not justified. So, I’m not quite sure that the definition of a Gettier case should be one in which there is justified belief that fails to constitute knowledge.

  2. Brian Weatherson says:

    Yeah, I’m being sloppy with that. What I want is something like Ernie Sosa’s idea that some beliefs are not true in virtue of being produced by a virtuous process. But perhaps that isn’t right either.

    The reason I don’t like the third definition is that I think there are some cases, like Harman’s dead dictator case, that feel like an importantly different kind of case to the ‘coincidental truth’ cases that I think are the core kind of Gettier case.

    Perhaps you’re right about what’s crucial is that the beliefs are reasonable, whether or not they’re justified. I’ll have to think about that more.

  3. clayton says:

    I hereby declare that the concept of Gettier case is unanalyzable. At best, we might state some necessary conditions.

    I happen to think you’re right about Harman’s dead dictator case and I feel the same about the fake barn case. I believe I’ve started calling these Gettierish cases and if I’m not mistaken (highly unlikely) I think I picked this up from you.

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