Philosophers’ Annual

Over at Certain Doubts, they have a thread going where people are nominating papers in epistemology for the Philosophers’ Annual. I’m not actually an official nominator for the Annual, but I know some nominators read this site, so I thought we’d have a similar thread here.

What I’m particularly interested in are papers that relate to any of the Arche projects that are currently underway. These are

What do you think are the best papers on any of these topics to have come out in the last 12 months? Bonus points for papers that are on several of these topics. (A great paper on why we need, for methdological reasons, to take people to have non-evidential warrant for accepting the existence of unarticulated constituents would be perfect, especially if it could somehow work in the foundations project.)

3 Replies to “Philosophers’ Annual”

  1. Although this paper has been available for some time before being published, I think it should be mentioned here:

    von Fintel, K. & Gillies, A.S. ‘CIA Leaks’, Philosophical Review 2008 117(1):77-98.

    This is relevant both for Basic Knowledge and Contextualism and Relativism, and has been influential in the debates over epistemic modals in both of these areas.

  2. I agree with Andreas about “CIA Leaks”

    For Methodology, I think it’s worth considering

    Carrie Jenkins “Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience”, The Philosophical Quarterly 58

    I think it provides the best discussion published so far of some central themes of Williamson’s book.

    As for Basic Knowledge, my other area of competence (althoug, needless to say, I haven’t read everything relevant!), there are two papers which seem worth mentioning, both relevant, in different ways, to problems of closure

    Maria Lasonen-Aarnio “Single Premise Deduction and Risk” Philosophical Studies 141

    Scott Sturgeon “Reason and the Grain of Belief” Nous 48

  3. Clearly relevant for the contextualism bit (and for this blog!) is Gillian Russell and John Doris’s excellent discussion of Jason Stanley’s practical interest theory of knowledge (in his Knowledge and Practical Interests):

    Russell, G., and Doris, J. 2008. Knowledge by indifference. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86, 429-437.

    It is a crisp, direct paper that adduces a series of new counterexamples to Stanley’s views about knowledge. Really clever.


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