*Probability: Subjective vs. Objective
*Epistemology: Internalist vs. Externalist

You’re right that a factive account will have an externalist component. I was talking across the distinctions above, and if ‘Subjective’ does not equal ‘Internal’ and ‘Objective’ does not equal ‘External’, then there is some conflation of terms in my comment. Your position now seems to be aligned with a Subjective/Externalist rendering of evidence. It is subjective in that p must be known to be true by some individual or community (note: Achinstein subscribes to an objective view of evidence in that evidence is an impersonal concept, i.e., p need not be known to be true by any individual or community). Most epistemologists endorse a subjective notion of evidence because evidence is spoken of in relation to a subject or a community of subjects. The prototypical question is whether, “S’s evidence includes e.” Your view is also externalist because of the factivity aspect. This is where Maher requires luminosity: S must know that p is true, i.e., the truth of p must be luminous to S—often as the result of empirical observation that provides non-inferential knowledge. However, this is where Achinstein recognizes the opacity of evidence. That is, p must in fact be true to count as evidence regardless of whether S knows that S knows that p is true. Things get a little tricky though. This is because Achinstein adopts an internalist constraint on evidence in addition to the externalist constraint: p must be true and S must believe that p is true (but S is not required to know that p is true, in terms of being able to access the truth of p).

So, in looking at some of the details, it seems that your view aligns closer with Maher’s view even though there is some overlap with Achinstein’s view. Aligning with Maher exposes your view, and Littlejohn’s non-inferential view, to the objections raised by Achinstein to Maher’s view. It seems you could get some mileage out of looking at the exchange between these philosophers.

Note: You might also pickup on the need to sync the term ‘know’ across the domains. Probability theorists and epistemologists have different levels of stringency in the application of the term (probability theorists being more lax and epistemologists being more stringent for obvious reasons).

I actually do think that p must be known to be evidence. But I don’t know why having a truth requirement would make the view more externalist than Maher’s. After all, any view which puts a factive requirement on evidence will have an externalist component.

Some neglected works on evidence and epistemology are N.M.L Nathan’s Evidence and Assurance (1980) and Moser’s Knowledge and Evidence (1989). Haack’s Evidence and Inquiry (1993) is typically only mentioned in relation to structural issues in epistemology, but in formulating Founherentism Haack discussed things about evidence that it might be worth looking at. Haack talks about the distinction between evidential and non-evidential components of belief (pp. 76-77).

Those are a few references off the top of my head.

Where’s your costume?

This isn’t exactly Schroeder’s view. He thinks that there are two types of reasons relations—the objective and the subjective. Objective reasons have to be true, but subjective reasons needn’t be (they just have to have the following property: if they were true, they would be objective reasons). Moreover, he thinks that one can have a subjective reason if one has a presentational attitude with that proposition as its content. He thus denies that you have to stand in some positive justificatory relationship (e.g. knowing) in order to have a (subjective) reason. He thinks that justification is a function of subjective reasons—i.e. he thinks that justification supervenes on subjective reasons. He thinks that dropping both the factivity condition on having (subjective) reasons and the high bar allows one to give a simpler, more explanatory unified account of perceptual justification. But it is very important for this story that subjective reasons needn’t be true. (Also, I should point out that he is neutral about some of the story I just told in “Having Reasons.” I take some of this story from the paper I mention below and some of his other work (Slaves of the Passions, for example).

He has another paper forthcoming in a volume about reasons for belief that further draws the lessons out in epistemology. It’s called “What Does it take to ‘Have’ a Reason,” and it’s available on his website. (Full disclosure; I have a paper coming out in Phil Studies that is a response to his original “Having Reasons.” It’s called “Having Reasons and The Factoring Account.”)