I’ve
posted the day’s changes to the philosophy
papers blog. There are six changes, though three of them look suspiciously
small. Eric
Funkhouser, Lex
Newman and the APA News
page seem to have just corrected typos on their pages. Either that or there’s
a bug in the tracker program. (The disjunction here is inclusive, as all
disjunctions are.) Timothy
Shanahan has updated his CV.

The Tanner Library
reports a batch of new journals over Christmas. You’ll probably want to check
through the list for yourself to see what new paper papers you want to read,
but the following three stood out to me. This Nick
Bostrom paper is now out in J Phil,
which will be relevant to those of you interested in de se probability theory. (—That’s
everyone isn’t it? —And a few more.)  Lloyd
Humberstone’s paper on autoepistemic logic is out in Theoria. And Heinrich Wansing has
a paper on the knowability paradox in Journal of
Philosophical Logic with a title I wish I’d almost thought of: Diamonds
are a Philosopher’s Best Friends.

Getting back to the purpose of this all, Gilbert Harman
has posted a draft of the paper he’ll read
at the forthcoming APA on Jonathan Adler’s book Beliefs Own Ethics. The
conclusion, very roughly, is that while Adler defends the first of the
following two principles, in fact the second is correct:

: In fully believing that P, the content
of what you come to accept refers to itself: “P and I believe this whole
conjunctive content because I have adequate evidence for it.”

Self-referential
Guarantee in Belief Content: The content of a full
belief that P is: “I am in this mental state because of something that ensures
that P.”