I wrote a short paper on problems contextualism has with questions about knowledge. The problem concerns the following exchange.

A: Does S know that p?
B: No, he thinks p is true but he’s just guessing.

If contextualism (i.e. Lewis-Cohen-DeRose style speaker-contextualism) is true, then B’s answer is correct iff S doesn’t know _by A’s standards_. But intuitively B should answer according to whether S knows _by B’s standards_ or, perhaps, _by S’s standards_. Problem.

bq. “Questioning Contextualism”:http://brian.weatherson.org/qc2.pdf

The paper goes into more details about why this is exactly what contextualism predicts and why “single scoreboard” type responses don’t help as much as some might think they do. I don’t think the core examples are completely tight yet, but it’s a reasonable work-in-progress.

(The paper as it currently stands benefited a lot from conversations with “Ishani”:http://philosophy.syr.edu/maitra.html and “Tamar”:http://people.cornell.edu/pages/tsg3/.)