This is the acknowledgments footnote from Timothy Williamson’s “Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives”:http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/faculty/members/docs/Reference.pdf.

bq. This paper discusses some of the same phenomena as the fascinating Kaplan 2004, and reaches conclusions that are in some respects quite similar (a difference concerning the notion of validity is noted below). One sign of my general debt to David Kaplan is the difficulty that I have in writing a paper without citing Kaplan 1989, a difficulty that I share with many other philosophers of language. I first encountered his work as an undergraduate, when I read Kaplan 1969, and was immediately impressed by his intellectual fertility, his rigour and his playfulness. Opponents of the scientific spirit in philosophy often associate it with humourless severity, sterility, and indifference to nuance and aesthetic value. David is a wonderful counterexample. Playfulness is one of the best antidotes to that toxin for the scientific spirit, the desire for salvation from philosophy. Precision forces one to respect the subtle distinctions that free-flowing ‘humanistic’ prose pours indifferently over. Rigour provides the constraints that distinguish creativity from arbitrary variation. By precedent rather than precept, logic teaches the value of elegance and a sense of form, even in the search for truth.