Another installment of the dogmatism epic.

bq. “In Defence of a Dogmatist”:http://brian.weatherson.org/dog1_5.pdf (sections 1-5 of 6)

In the latest section I respond to Bayesian arguments against dogmatism by suggesting that Bayesianism is too restrictive a model to use when modelling the situations about which dogmatists say distinctive things. I suggest a more expansive model that I call dynamic Keynesianism, which is compatible with dogmatism and is independently plausible as an appropriate model.

The only remaining section to be written is on Moore’s argument, about which I have a lot to read and not a lot to say. The main line I suspect I’ll end up taking is that there is a real disanalogy between learning what the world looks like for the first time, and confirming that your hands have not gone missing while you weren’t looking. Dogmatism isn’t very plausible about the second case, but it doesn’t need to be, for in that case there _is_ independent justification to believe that things are as they seem. But this is all well into the future.