Wo thinks Im wrong in
saying the world is gruesome. Hes got a point, though I think that the
underlying argument I wanted to make still goes through. Wo wanted to argue
that (1) was a better candidate to be a complete theory of everything than (2),
or presumably its cognates like (3).
(1) w
exists.
(2) Everything is F.
(3) There is a G.
In (3) I take G to be a predicate of
worlds that only this one satisfies. In (2) F is a predicate that any
thing satisfies in virtue of being a member of a world that is G. That
looks on the surface like a gruesome property, since it doesnt make for
similarity among the things that satisfy it in any but a very artificial way. G
on the other hand has no such problem. Anything that satisfies G is just
like any (other) thing that satisfies G, probably because theres only
one of them in the pluriverse. (Well, maybe there are more if there are
pluralities of duplicate worlds, a point that Lewis sometimes reveals
uncertainties about.)
So what I should have said is that (1) has
no virtues as a theory of the world over (3). I put this first by saying that
the world isnt a particularly natural object. What I should have said is that
the world is exactly as natural as the property of being a G. Perhaps
the world is natural as objects go, though it looks to me like a fairly
scattered fusion of disparate elements. But if it is natural, then the property
of being just that way is also natural.
What also seems to be the case is that any
term that picks out w, or G, will have to be, in one sense or
other, magic. Because as natural as w might be, for any putative name
for w, say @, there will be several other eligible referents, all of
which will be just as natural as w, and all of which will satisfy our
uses of @ in all the respects that w does, perhaps save one. So for @
to refer to w rather than to w´ will take something that looks
like magic.
What about the one respect in which w
is not like w´, that we can make demonstrative reference to it. Well,
thats an important difference, and its how we do manage to have names for
things like the actual world. But if youre going to let demonstratives into
your theory of everything, then we could restate (3) as Something is thus-ly
demonstrating the way the world is. So I still dont see a way in which
theories like (1) are better than theories like (3).