I’ve posted the day’s changes to the philosophy papers blog. There
are four changes. Two of these are (I think) new papers. Alexander Bird
has posted a new paper on Kuhn,
nominalism and empiricism
. Bird concludes

Kuhn described
himself as a Kantian with moveable categories; I have described him as a
constructive empiricist with moveable observability.

Eric Funkhouser has also
added a paper on Bernard
Williams
. Here’s the blurb for it.

Bernard Williams
has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is
necessarily the case that we cannot directly will to believe. Many others have
adopted Williams’ claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive
reasons and evidence. By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that
believers can quite consciously disregard the norm of truth, and they can dismiss
the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence. The irrationality of those
who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by
some actual believers. So, our inability to directly will to believe is a
contingent truth (at best).

Eric also notes that his paper on causal overdetermination
has now been published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. There’s a bit of a
glut of papers by ex-Syracusans on overdetermination lately. Ted Sider also has a paper
forthcoming in PPR on it. (Two isn’t really a glut is it?
Well, I guess not, but I might write a paper on
overdetermination. And three would be a glut, wouldn’t it?)

Two other changes look less substantive. Erik Myin has added some
line items to his papers list, but without adding the papers. And Wayne Wright has changed the
formatting of and the introductory note to his webpage.