Silly philosophy question.

Say one holds the following combination of views:

Fictionalism about mereology – you think that it’s not true that there are fusions of objects, though it is a useful fiction to talk as if here are

Realism about fictional characters – you think the characters in a fiction are real, if abstract, objects

Would it follow that you end up being a realist about fusions after all, just you now think they are abstracta that are constituents of the giant mereological fiction that we find it convenient to be guided by in daily life? I think this would be a fun position. “No actually it isn’t a consequence of my position that there are no tables, chairs or beer mugs, but it is a consequence of my position that they are all abstract objects. I don’t see why this is objectionable.”

I should note that as fun as it may be, this is not my combination of views, though I am tempted by realism about fictional characters. To be fair, I should note that at least some days I think tables, chairs and beer mugs are events rather than objects, so the ludicrous view tabled here is not a million miles from what I, at least some of the time, think. When I’m being more sensible I think tables are fusions of this-worldly and other-worldly parts, and the other-worldly parts are, of course, abstracta because other possible worlds are abstract. I think there’s a reason I haven’t been doing much metaphysics lately.