A question

There’s a lot of stuff in the literature right now on norms about assertion. One issue is whether asserting something you don’t know can ever be appropriate. Another issue is whether you might be criticisable for assertions of things you do know. Of course, some assertions of things you know are irrelevant, or unhelpful, but the issue here is whether this is the only kind of way in which an assertion of something you know can be criticised. Consider the following example.

S believes that p. S is self-aware, so she knows that she believes that p. Unfortunately, this belief is utterly crazy. S has a lot of evidence that ~p, which she is systematically ignoring. She asserts “I believe that p”. Is her utterance criticisable? If so, in what way? Is it criticizable _qua_ assertion?

A question

There’s a lot of stuff in the literature right now on norms about assertion. One issue is whether asserting something you don’t know can ever be appropriate. Another issue is whether you might be criticisable for assertions of things you do know. Of course, some assertions of things you know are irrelevant, or unhelpful, but the issue here is whether this is the only kind of way in which an assertion of something you know can be criticised. Consider the following example.

S believes that p. S is self-aware, so she knows that she believes that p. Unfortunately, this belief is utterly crazy. S has a lot of evidence that ~p, which she is systematically ignoring. She asserts “I believe that p”. Is her utterance criticisable? If so, in what way? Is it criticizable _qua_ assertion?