Recently several epistemologists, such as David Christensen, Adam Elga and Richard Feldman, have endorsed a fairly strong view about disagreement. Roughly, the idea is that if you believe p, and someone as smart as you and as well informed as you believes ~p, then you should replace your belief in p with either a suspension of judgment (in Feldman’s view), or a probability of p between their probability and your old probability (in Elga’s view).
I’m glossing over a lot of details here because I think there is a way to see that no view anything like this can be accepted. Many other epistemologists (Tom Kelly, Ralph Wedgwood) do not hold the Christensen-Elga-Feldman view. So by their own lights, Christensen et al should not believe their own view, because according to them they shouldn’t believe a proposition on which there is disagreement among peers, and this epistemological theory is a proposition on which there is disagreement among peers.
I think no one should accept a view that will be unacceptable to them if they come to accept it. So I think no one should accept the Christensen-Elga-Feldman view. Indeed, I think the probabilistic version of it is incoherent because of a variant of the above argument. I’ve written up a short paper saying why.
bq. “Disagreeing about Disagreement”:http://brian.weatherson.org/DaD.pdf