When I posted my “conditionals and indexical relativism”:http://brian.weatherson.org/CaIR.pdf paper the othe week, I mentioned that part of the motivation for the view came from Tamina Stephenson’s work. Along these lines, I have two updates to report. First, she has a new version of the paper where PRO_J is introduced.

bq. “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste”:http://web.mit.edu/tamina/www/em-ppt-revised-6-05-07.pdf

Second, she has a “handout from a talk on conditionals and relativism”:http://web.mit.edu/tamina/www/CLS-handout.pdf. Happily, it is a slightly different version of relativism to mine. (Diversity is always a philosophic boon!) She takes the propositions expressed by conditionals to be sets of world-judge pairs, and uses this to explain what’s going on in Gibbardian standoff. I think these propositions are (or determine) sets of possible worlds, and I’m not sure there is anything in Gibbardian standoffs that our semantics needs to explain.

Anyway, both links are highly recommended.