I’ve been thinking recently about the possible fruitfulness of comparing cleverly-disguised-mule-worries (CDMW) in epistemology with Kripkensteinian-meaning-underdetermination-worries (KMUW).
I think it is helpful, in understanding CDMW, to think about two kinds of questions:
(1) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than lions?
(2) Why does S believe those animals are zebras rather than cleverly disguised mules?
‘Because they are zebras’ looks like a good answer to questions like (1) and a bad answer to questions like (2).
For a contextualist explanationist about knowledge like myself, this suggests that in contexts where the question ‘Is S’s belief explained by the fact believed?’ amounts to something like (1), ‘S knows they are zebras’ looks good, and in contexts where that question amounts to something like (2), ‘S knows they are zebras’ looks bad.
What I find suggestive, in trying to understand KMUW, is an analogy with the questions:
(1′) Why does S use ‘plus’ for addition rather than subtraction?
(2′) Why does S ‘plus’ for addition rather than quaddition?
‘Because of the dubbing, or otherwise word-defining, activities of S’s linguistic predecessors’ looks like a good answer to questions like (1′) and a bad answer to questions like (2′).
More on this topic will follow …