I just uploaded a very drafty version of a short paper I’m working on for a workshop in Edinburgh on scepticism.
bq. “Moderate Rationalism and Bayesian Scepticism”:http://brian.weatherson.org/MRaBS.pdf
The paper is an argument against any theorist who holds (a) that we can know substantive facts about the nature of epistemic justification a priori, but (b) we can’t know deeply contingent truths a priori. The example used in the paper is someone who holds that we can know a priori that process reliabilism is the right theory of epistemic justification, but who also holds that there is no deeply contingent a priori. The argument is that the (by now familiar) Bayesian objection to dogmatism, although not a good objection to dogmatism, is a good objection to such a view.
The paper is extremely choppy right now, and hopefully I’ll flesh out some of the arguments. But I thought it was worth posting the very drafty version in case it doesn’t get improved before the workshop!