Here are two things I’ve been working on recently.
This is a follow up to my 2005 paper “Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment”:http://brian.weatherson.org/cwdwpe.pdf. I argue that thinking about decision theory gives us a new way to appreciate the argument for the interest-relativity of knowledge. I also argue, or perhaps I should say concede, that cases where agents have false beliefs about the decision they are facing provide a reason for thinking there is a kind of ‘basic’ interest-relativity to knowledge. That is, in these cases there is an aspect of interest-relativity to knowledge that cannot be explained by the interest-relativity of belief.
These are the notes for my grad seminar on scepticism that’s currently ongoing. I’ll update this link a few times during the semester. The notes are very drafty, but maybe they’ll be of some interest as a way of thinking about scepticism.
I’ve been thinking of trying to do a 100-level course on scepticism. Obviously that would involve very different levels of detail and explanation to a graduate course, but I’m starting to think that some of the material I’ve covered in this seminar could work at 100-level. I doubt it would be as popular as “Shelly Kagan lecturing on Death”:http://dailybulletin.yale.edu/article.aspx?id=7848, but it could I think be useful.