Jacob Levy writes that he

Jacob Levy writes that he is worried that Australia, like Britain and Canada, is turning into a one-party state.
Since I’m about to be in Australia, it’s probably time for another Australian politics post.

Basically, I think Jacob’s fears here are overstated. (At least with respect to Australia. With respect to Britain and Canada, they may be justified soon enough.)
The ALP’s position in Federal politics right now is much better than the Coalition’s was when Downer was Liberal leader. They are closer in the polls, more people support them on the issues, and they have co-operative and popular state governments in place in every state. (And they haven’t been out of power for as long, though that’s a mixed blessing.) Of course by the time that parliamentary term was over, the Coalition had won one of the biggest wins in Australian history. This isn’t to say that Simon Crean is another Downer, or the ALP will have a thumping win next election, or even that they’re likely to win, but it’s much too early to judge that the ALP can’t win.

In any case, the dangers of one-party rule, which is what most concerns Jacob, are much ameliorated when different parties control the state and Federal parliaments. At least, the concerns that he sees as most pressing are not that pressing. I’m guessing this wasn’t his major concern, but there is one problem starting to emerge.

As long as Labor controls the states and the Coalition the Federal govt, smart young operatives on the Labor side will move into state politics and smart operatives on the conservative side into Federal politics. This drift won’t be as strong on the Labor side, because there’s always some temptation to go for the big prizes in Federal politics. But you’d expect all the talented players on the conservative side to be in Federal politics. As far as I can tell, that’s exactly what has happened, with the result that the state oppositions are remarkably short of talent. And at the state level, where people are more inclined to vote on the basis of apparent competence than on the basis of ideological agreement, that’s a recipe for disaster. It’s a nasty spiral to get into I fear. Again, history says that you can get out of this trap – Labor was in a similar position ten or so years ago after all and they eventually climbed out – but until the Liberals can convince their more talented young operatives that they’d rather spend their formative years in state opposition than federal government, it could be a long haul.

Papers blog is up. Two

Papers blog is up. Two things worth commenting on. (Well, perhaps more than that, but two things I have comments on.)

I think this paper went up back in the dark ages, perhaps as far ago as last Wednesday, but somehow I only caught it now. Andy Egan and Jim John wrote a short paper, largely a critical survey, on problems intrinsicness poses for representational theories of phenomenology. Roughly, the puzzle is that (intuitively) phenonemology is intrinsic and content isn’t, so by Leibniz’s Law phenomenology can’t be identical with content. But as stated this isn’t a pressing puzzle, because there’s a pretty powerful argument against one of the intuitions.

Phenomenology is extrinsic, for the reasons Ted Sider sets out here. The mereological difference between me and one of my hairs has no phenomenal character, but its duplicate in a world where I lack that hair has lots and lots of feelings, few of them to do with the missing hair.

I guess this is just a technical difficulty, and the puzzle they are getting at can be restated easily enough, but I’m not entirely sure how to do it. Maybe they can follow Ted’s suggestion and use stars everywhere as a way of restating the trilemma they are most interested in. But I suspect that’s just a matter of noting that the problem exists rather than actually solving it. There’s still clearly a problem because the respects in virtue of which phenomenology is extrinsic are still different to the (alleged) respects in virtue of which content is extrinsic. So I don’t think this changes much about the underlying dynamic. But Andy and Jim (and everyone else in the relevant literature) shouldn’t be using the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic here.

Geoff Nunberg has an article largely about TLAs in which he doesn’t use "TLA". By the way, is it TLAs or TLA’s? It’s not a possessive, so you’d think an apostraphe wouldn’t be appropriate, but as thrice seen in this sentence, some apostraphes are just for contraction. And there sort of is a contraction there I guess. But by that logic, the singular should be T’L’A’, which it manifestly isn’t.