Over Time, Citations Get More Uneven

In an earlier post, I compared the distribution of citations within _Journal of Philosophy_, 1976 and _Philosophical Studies_, 2009. And I noted that although the two ended up in similar places, they got there in different ways. _Journal of Philosophy_ was largely relying on some hugely cited papers; while the distribution of citations in _Philosophical Studies_ was more even. And I suggested that this was part of a trend in the discipline towards more egalitarian citation practices.

In Facebook comments on this post, Ben Blumson and Peter Michael Gerdes suggested an alternative explanation. Perhaps the citations are more unbalanced in _Journal of Philosophy_, 1976 because the longer a journal is out, the more a consensus builds up around what the great papers are in it, and the more those papers (and those papers only) get cited. In effect, I was seeing an age effect, and viewing it as a cohort effect.

So I looked at the data, and it looks like they were very largely correct. All the points below come from investigating the citations to papers in _Journal of Philosophy_, 1976.

I broke the citations up into those appearing before and after 1995. In fact more of the citations come after 1995, which was surprising. (That might be due to Web of Science’s coverage getting more comprehensive in recent years.) We can then calculate a Gini coefficient for the citations before and after 1995. (We usually do Gini coefficients for things like income or wealth, but the same idea can be used for citations; think of each cite to an article as a bit of wealth that article gets.)

The numbers ended up being:

* For citations before 1995, Gini is 0.83.
* For citations after 1995, Gini is 0.92.

Now both of these numbers are really high, but that’s largely because I included the book reviews, which basically get 0 citations, in the mix. But the second number is much higher. Note that Gini goes on a 0-1 scale, so going from 0.83 to 0.92 is going half way to a situation where only one article gets all the citations; it’s a big jump.

Here’s another way to look at the data. I broke down the articles into those that had (across all 40 years) the 10 highest citation counts, and the rest of the articles. (There are about 130 of them, though many are discussion notes or book reviews.)

* Among the 10 highest cited articles, 72% of citations came after 1995.
* Among the rest of the articles, 47% of the citations came after 1995.

So there’s a pattern here. And while it’s only one year, it isn’t surprising.

So I made a mistake here, though I think it’s an interesting mistake. I noticed that within any given year, the citations were getting more evenly spread the closer we got to the present. (That is, the Gini coefficient was going down over time.) I thought that was a cohort effect; it was something about how people interact with post-2000 journals as opposed to how they interact with pre-2000 journals. But it is more plausible that it is an age effect; it is something about how people interact with 20+ year-old journals as opposed to how they interact with younger journals.

It’s easy to confuse cohort effects and age effects. Lots of people look at voting data and conclude that people get more conservative as they get older. This isn’t, on the whole, true. It’s just that, in recent years in the English speaking world, each generation has been less conservative than the one that came before it. This hasn’t always been true; the boomers are much much more conservative than people who could remember the Great Depression. And historically the graph of voting pattern vs age had an inflection point around the time it got to people born in 1930. (That’s too small a group now to show up in the graphs.) And it isn’t true in modern day France, for example. (In the recent election, old folks did largely vote for Fillon, but Le Pen’s support was relatively constant across age groups.)

I’ve made the opposite confusion here; seeing something that really is an age effect as a cohort effect. Thanks to Ben and Peter for pointing this out.

Citations are Getting More Evenly Distributed

I claimed yesterday that citations within journals are getting more egalitarian. To verify this, I pulled the citation data for two prominent years: The Journal of Philosophy, 1976 and Philosophical Studies, 2009.

I couldn’t find an easy way to get just the citations in Arts & Humanities, so this table includes all the citations in Web of Science. (I checked a few articles, and the non-humanities citations average around 20% of the total citations, though the articles in political philosophy typically run a fair bit higher than that.)

The citations here are just through 2015; that makes a big difference to the most cited articles from 1976, and to many articles from 2009.

Both years I’m looking at have a number of discussion notes includes. The Journal of Philosophy used to publish papers presented at the APA, and the commentaries on them. So I’ve included a column showing how many pages are in each article, to give you a sense of when an article is really just a discussion note.

First, the citations of articles in The Journal of Philosophy, 1976. I’ve deleted the book reviews, and the discussion notes that were 3 pages or less.

Title Author Cites Pages
Discrimination And Perceptual Knowledge Goldman, AI 370 21
Schizophrenia Of Modern Ethical Theories Stocker, M 172 14
Motive Utilitarianism Adams, RM 55 15
Explanation, Conjunction, And Unification Kitcher, P 52 6
Putnam’s Theory On Reference Of Substance Terms Zemach, EM 40 12
Two Types Of Foundationalism Alston, WP 36 21
Grades Of Discriminability Quine, WV 33 4
Humes Cognitive Theory Of Pride Davidson, D 32 14
Worlds Away Quine, WV 30 5
Truth And Assertibility Brandom, R 28 13
Knowledge, Causality, And Defeasibility Klein, PD 26 21
What Is A Logical Constant Peacocke, C 22 20
Social Choice And Derivation Of Rawls’s Difference Principle Strasnick, S 21 15
Necessity Of Origin Mcginn, C 21 9
Counterfactuals With Disjunctive Antecedents Loewer, B 17 7
Direction Of Causation And Direction Of Conditionship Sanford, DH 16 15
Save Phenomena Van Fraassen, BC 15 10
History And Hermeneutics Ricoeur, P 13 13
Mentality And Neutrality Rosenthal, DM 12 30
Causation – Matter Of Life And Death Earman, J 11 21
Psychology Of Benevolence And Its Implications For Philosophy Brandt, RB 7 25
Comments On Nozicks Entitlement Theory Davis, L 7 9
Theory Of Language Harris, Z 6 24
Identity Statements And Microreductions Enc, B 6 22
Mechanism, Functionalism, And Identity Theory Nelson, RJ 6 21
Entitlement Theory Of Distributive Justice Goldman, AH 6 13
Ontological Reduction Gottlieb, D 5 20
Method For Ontology, With Applications To Numbers And Events Gottlieb, D 3 15
Inferential Justification And Empiricism Fumerton, RA 3 13
Discernibility Of Identicals Moravcsik, JME 3 12
Labor Theory Of Property Acquisition Becker, LC 3 12
Rawls’s Original Position And Difference Principle Goldman, AH 3 5
Space And Objects Oneill, O 2 17
Meaning And Perception Pastin, M 2 15
Strasnicks Derivation Of Rawlss Difference Principle Wolff, RP 2 10
Projectability Unscathed Ullian, J; Goodman, N 2 5
Carrots, Noses, Snow, Rose, Roses Gass, WH 1 15
Strawson On Predication Moravcsik, JME 0 20
Practical Reason And Concept Of A Human Being Scott, S 0 14
Charles Taylor’s Hegel Soll, I 0 14
Identity Of Indiscernibles Nagel, G 0 6

Next, the citations of articles in Philosophical Studies, 2009. I’ve deleted the articles that were 3 pages or less, and the introductions to the book symposia. I’ve left the rest of the symposia in, though many of these have very few citations. (The symposia contributions mostly are around 10 pages or so.)

Title Author Cites Pages
Knowledge and credit Lackey, Jennifer 35 16
Spacetime the one substance Schaffer, Jonathan 31 18
Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons Schroeder, Mark 30 26
Absence of evidence and evidence of absence Sober, Elliott 28 28
Shared intention and personal intentions Gilbert, Margaret 28 21
Models and fictions in science Godfrey-Smith, Peter 27 16
Knowledge and success from ability Greco, John 25 10
Oughts and ends Finlay, Stephen 25 26
Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention Bratman, Michael E. 20 17
Weighing the aim of belief Steglich-Petersen, Asbjorn 20 11
Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction Ichikawa, Jonathan; Jarvis, Benjamin 19 26
A better best system account of lawhood Cohen, Jonathan; Callender, Craig 19 34
A Virtue Epistemology Pritchard, Duncan 17 10
In defense of adaptive preferences Bruckner, Donald W. 17 18
Models, measurement and computer simulation Morrison, Margaret 16 25
Epistemology without metaphysics Field, Hartry 16 42
The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief Reisner, Andrew 15 16
Determination, realization and mental causation Wilson, Jessica 15 21
Motivated contextualism Henderson, David 15 13
Individuals Dasgupta, Shamik 14 33
The folk on knowing how Bengson, John; Moffett, Marc A.; Wright, Jennifer C. 14 15
The neural evidence for simulation is weaker than I think you think it is Saxe, Rebecca 13 10
Empathy, social psychology, and global helping traits Miller, Christian B. 13 29
Self-representationalism and phenomenology Kriegel, Uriah 13 25
Intuitions are inclinations to believe Earlenbaugh, Joshua; Molyneux, Bernard 12 21
The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion Montague, Michelle 11 22
The open future Barnes, Elizabeth; Cameron, Ross 11 19
Revisionism about free will Vargas, Manuel 11 18
The perils of Perrin, in the hands of philosophers van Fraassen, Bas C. 11 20
Inter-species variation in colour perception Allen, Keith 11 24
Assertion, Moore, and Bayes Douven, Igor 11 15
What good is a diachronic will? Ferrero, Luca 10 28
Knowing full well Sosa, Ernest 9 11
Moral judgment purposivism Bedke, M. S. 9 21
Replies Williamson, Timothy 9 12
A new argument for skepticism Reed, Baron 9 14
Imagination and other scripts Funkhouser, Eric; Spaulding, Shannon 9 24
Dubious assertions Sosa, David 9 4
Evidence-based policy Cartwright, Nancy 8 10
Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics Gill, Michael B. 8 20
Reduction and emergence: a critique of Kim Needham, Paul 8 24
The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions Brady, Michael S. 8 18
Experience and self-consciousness Schear, Joseph K. 8 11
Semantic intuitions, conceptual analysis, and cross-cultural variation Jackman, Henry 7 19
Compatibilism & desert McKenna, Michael 7 11
Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading de Vignemont, Frederique 7 10
A consistent way with paradox Goldstein, Laurence 7 13
Utterance at a distance Stevens, Graham 7 9
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases Rives, Bradley 6 28
Triviality arguments against functionalism Godfrey-Smith, Peter 6 23
Hard incompatibilism and its rivals Pereboom, Derk 6 13
Imaginability, morality, and fictional truth Todd, Cain Samuel 5 25
Is computer simulation changing the face of experimentation? Giere, Ronald N. 5 4
Contextualism, relativism and ordinary speakers’ judgments Montminy, Martin 5 16
Structural equations and causation Hitchcock, Christopher 5 11
Moral responsibility and agents’ histories Mele, Alfred 5 21
Summation relations and portions of stuff Donnelly, Maureen; Bittner, Thomas 5 19
Luminous enough for a cognitive home Fumerton, Richard 5 10
Virtuous intuitions Boghossian, Paul 4 9
Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information Roush, Sherrilyn 4 9
Replies Goldman, Alvin I. 4 15
Neither here nor there Debes, Remy 4 27
Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual Ichikawa, Jonathan 4 9
Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality Brunero, John 4 15
Advice for fallibilists Fantl, Jeremy; McGrath, Matthew 4 12
Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals Predelli, Stefano 4 13
Reference, perception, and attention Raftopoulos, Athanasios 4 22
On doing better, experimental-style Weinberg, Jonathan M. 4 10
Simulation and the first-person Carruthers, Peter 4 9
The modal status of materialism Levine, Joseph; Trogdon, Kelly 4 12
Moral advice and moral theory Leibowitz, Uri D. 4 11
Promises beyond assurance Southwood, Nicholas; Friedrich, Daniel 4 20
Intentional psychologism Pitt, David 4 22
Restricting factiveness Stjernberg, Fredrik 4 20
Replies to commentators Sosa, Ernest 3 11
I won’t do it Louise, Jennie 3 22
Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time Torre, Stephan 3 20
Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought Vessel, Jean-Paul 3 13
Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children Kahane, Guy 3 22
Liberalism and the general justifiability of punishment Hanna, Nathan 3 25
Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory Kawall, Jason 3 18
The Loop Case and Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect Liao, S. Matthew 3 9
Objective evidence and absence Strevens, Michael 3 10
The myth of the categorical counterfactual Barnett, David 3 16
Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori Warenski, Lisa 3 24
Difficult times for Humean identity? Garrett, Don 3 9
Normativity without artifice Bauer, Mark 3 21
Bennett and proxy actualism Nelson, Michael; Zalta, Edward N. 3 16
Reliabilism in philosophy Goldberg, Sanford C. 3 13
Sosa in perspective Kornblith, Hilary 3 10
Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice Boot, Martijn 2 18
Reupholstering a discipline Martin, M. G. F. 2 9
Contextualism, safety and epistemic relevance Blome-Tillmann, Michael 2 12
Simulation a la Goldman Perner, Josef; Brandl, Johannes L. 2 12
Bootstrapping and knowledge of reliability Brueckner, Anthony; Buford, Christopher T. 2 6
Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun? Bave, Arvid 2 14
Replies Sosa, Ernest 2 14
Physicalism and sparse ontology Trogdon, Kelly 2 19
Analyzing a priori knowledge Casullo, Albert 2 14
Fodor’s riddle of abduction Rellihan, Matthew J. 2 26
Knowledge as aptness Cohen, Stewart 2 5
Libertarianism Kane, Robert 2 10
Defense Draper, Kai 2 20
Aggregation, Partiality, and the Strong Beneficence Principle Dorsey, Dale 1 19
Comments Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1 8
Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives Brown, Derek Henry 1 18
A problem for Russellian theories of belief Ostertag, Gary 1 19
Replies Baxter, Donald L. M. 1 11
Science fictions Fine, Arthur 1 9
Plural signification and the Liar paradox Read, Stephen 1 13
Against structured referring expressions Sullivan, Arthur 1 26
The fate of a warrior culture Sherman, Nancy 1 10
Is knowledge a natural kind? Pernu, Tuomas K. 1 16
The fixity of reasons Gallois, Andre Norman 1 16
The event of color Pasnau, Robert 1 17
Ineliminable tension Lenard, Patti Tamara; Moore, Margaret R. 0 7
What is wrong with the indeterminacy of language-attribution? Khatchirian, Arpy 0 25
The a priori defended Thurow, Joshua C. 0 17
The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth Newhard, Jay 0 8
Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition Valaris, Markos 0 19
Trumping the causal influence account of causation Stone, Jim 0 8
Who they are and what de se Giberman, Daniel 0 15
Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs Piazza, Tommaso 0 14
Response Lear, Jonathan 0 13
Perilous thoughts Longino, Helen 0 8
Ultimacy and alternative possibilities Fischer, John Martin 0 6
Hume and Baxter on identity over time Falkenstein, Lorne 0 9
Noncomparabilism in epistemology Wunderlich, Mark Emerson 0 19
The inessential quasi-indexical Alward, Peter 0 21
A Virtue Epistemology, vol 1 Conee, Earl 0 10
Justification and awareness Markie, Peter J. 0 17
Hume and Frege on identity Perry, John 0 11
Fictions within fictions Hayaki, Reina 0 20
Reliability as a virtue Audi, Robert 0 12
The ethics of morphing Hare, Caspar 0 20
Sosa on scepticism Brown, Jessica 0 9

Now on the one hand there are a lot of articles here that didn’t get a lot of citations by 2015. On the other hand, there are 48 articles that had at least 7 citations (so at least 1/year), by 2015. That’s a huge number, and that’s why Philosophical Studies is getting so many citations – it publishes so many things that get at least some uptake. And that, I think, is very impressive.

Two More Graphs

Just as a follow up to the previous post, here are the graphs for six more journals. First their citations in the other 31.

Then their citations in the whole of Web of Science Arts and Humanities. (Note that this sometimes severely understates how many citations they have elsewhere in the academy, especially for philosophy of science and political philosophy papers.)

The big story of these, I think, is the overall upwards trends of the graphs. This is most dramatic in the case of PPR, but it is there across the board.

AJP has suffered a little bit since 2000 without Lewis articles to boost its citation counts. Its recent years compare well to its earlier years that didn’t contain a Lewis paper, but not so well to (for example) 1983, 1984 and 1996. It’s hard to find papers like “New Work”, “Putnam’s Paradox” and “Elusive Knowledge” to publish every year.

Changes in Who is Cited

The dataset of citations I’m looking at starts in 1976. And I can break down not just which journals are cited, but which years of those journals are cited. (And which years they are cited in, but I’m setting aside that data for now.) So as well as asking which journal is the most cited – it’s The Journal of Philosophy by a reasonable amount – we can ask which journals papers in year X ended up being the most cited.

And from 1976 through to the early 1990s, it is The Journal of Philosophy by a lot. Fourteen of the 25 most cited journal-years are from the 1976-1991 run of The Journal of Philosophy.

Through the 1990s The Journal is still the most cited, but it is much closer. (That is, for most years in the 1990s, the articles in The Journal from that year ended up with more citations than articles from any other journal.)

But from around 2002 onwards, the most cited journal is Philosophical Studies. Here are a couple of graphs that show the change.

First, I’ve graphed the number of citations each journal has in the other 31 journals in the data set. Each dot represents a single journal-year. So the top right at the top left represents that the single most cited journal-year in the data set is The Journal of Philosophy‘s 1976 volume. It featured really influential pieces by Alvin Goldman and Michael Stocker, and those articles alone would have been enough to make it a standout year.

The lines are loess curves through the data points; the dots are the actual measurements. The lines mostly slope down towards the end, because articles published in recent years have fewer chances to build up a citation count.

Note that almost all the dots towards the top of the graph are red, they are for The Journal of Philosophy. There is a dot for Nous 1979 (which included famous articles by Perry, Lewis and Cartwright), but otherwise the high points on the left are all red dots. But as we go into the 2000s, the purple line moves ahead, and the purple dots become more visible at the top edge of the graph.

I stopped the graph in 2010, because after that the number of citations starts to get very small. There just hasn’t been enough time for some of those articles to be cited. But the same pattern holds; indeed, Philosophical Studies takes a more pronounced lead.

The pattern is the same if we look not just at citations in the other 31 philosophy journals I focussed on, but at all journals in the Web of Science Arts & Humanities Index.

Now part of this is that Philosophical Studies publishes so many articles that it can do very well on graphs of raw citation count. But this isn’t the whole story. After all, Philosophical Studies has published a lot of articles per year for a long time, but the jump in citations is relatively recent.

There is one other striking thing about this recent surge in citations to Philosophical Studies: it largely happens without any individual articles getting huge numbers of citations. Some years there are articles in Philosophical Studies with huge citations. In 2006 the articles by Knobe and by Street are a big reason why Philosophical Studies does so well. But not all years are like that. A big part of the story is that Philosophical Studies went from having its not-so-huge articles get 5 citations a piece, to getting 10 citations a piece, and that adds up.

The underlying story is that citations are getting much more egalitarian, both across and within journals.

And it is striking just how big a role The Journal of Philosophy played in the philosophy world up to 1990, and how big a role Philosophical Studies plays nowadays.

Citation Graphs, One Journal at a Time

The big graphs I posted earlier have so much information, that much of it gets lost in the mess of lines. So I’ve broken down the data to create a graph just involving each journal’s interactions with the other 31. Here are the graphs. (As always, click on each for a larger image.)

British Journal of Aesthetics Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Journal of the History of Philosophy Phronesis
Kant Studien Journal of Political Philosophy
Philosophy and Public Affairs Ethics
Biology and Philosophy Synthese
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science
Economics and Philosophy Review of Metaphysics
Journal of Philosophical Logic Review of Symbolic Logic
Mind and Language Linguistics and Philosophy
Episteme Philosophical Studies
Mind Philosophical Quarterly
Analysis Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Noûs
Philosophical Review Journal of Philosophy
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Southern Journal of Philosophy
American Philosophical Quarterly Canadian Journal of Philosophy

I don’t have a lot of commentary on these beyond what I’ve said already, but here are a few quick thoughts about them.

  • When comparing different graphs, look at the scale before making judgments. The numbers are really different across journals.
  • CJP is more balanced than other journals, especially on moral/political and history. The red bar near the start of the outer ring is a sign of how much it interacts with Ethics.
  • Philosophical Studies is a huge part of the ecosystem. Partially that’s because of its size, but not entirely.
  • By the citation numbers, Review of Metaphysics is basically a history journal at this stage, and Economics and Philosophy is, insofar as it is a philosophy journal, a moral/political journal.
  • Mind has slightly more interactions with the logic journals than the other generalist journals do, but it isn’t dramatic.
  • Looking at the history journals makes Philosophical Review’s interactions with them more prominent than it is on the larger graph.
  • The difference between how much Episteme cites the American generalist journals and how much it cites the Commonwealth journals is fascinating. I don’t know how much this is the (quite normal) bias journals have towards journals that are geographically near them, and how much it reflects a different attitude towards epistemology in the US vs Commonwealth journals.
  • The citations to Analysis are much more balanced across the generalist journals than I expected; I thought journals would differ in how much they wanted to engage with Analysis articles.

Citation Graphs and Methodology

Last week I posted some graphs showing how often various journals cite other journals. Here is one of those graphs, just to remind you what they looked like.

I didn’t say particularly clearly how I got the data, or even exactly what the graphs meant. So here’s the long methodology post showing how I ended up with graphs like this one.

The data all come from Web of Science, and in particular its “Cited Reference Search”. For each of the 32 journals I was looking at, and each of the 40 years in 1976–2015, I searched for all citations to that journal in that year. So, for instance, I did a search under “Cited Reference Search” where the source was Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and the year was 1996. I set the “Timespan” to be 1976–2015, and the Indexes to search to be just the Arts & Humanities Citation Index.

When you do that, you get a list of possible articles that you might want to look at the citations of. (These are, roughly, all the things published in that journal in that year.) I hit select all, because I wanted to see everything that cited at least one of those journals, and then downloaded some information about everything that turned up.

Note three things about doing the search this way:

  1. I didn’t even download any information about which individual articles were being cited. The method got me more information than I needed (or even wanted) about the citing articles, but none at all about what was cited. Obviously there is a lot of interest in which articles are being cited, but that will be left for others to do.
  2. This method will only turn up citations to the article in the journal. So if someone just cited, say, “Elusive Knowledge” just in its reprint in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, and not in the original AJP publication, it won’t show up. I don’t think this made a huge difference, but it affected some things. For instance, Stephen Barker’s 2011 Noûs paper “Can Counterfactuals Really Be about Possible Worlds?” doesn’t show up in the list of papers citing AJP 1996, because the reference to “Elusive Knowledge” is just to the reprint. So this is one way some noise creeps into the system.
  3. At each of the 1280 stages, I’m doing a disjunctive search: Find all things that cite that journal in that year. The search doesn’t discriminate between things that cite five articles from that year and things that cite one article from that year. I think this is probably a good thing; citations to multiple articles in one year are usually citations to a single thread, and I’d rather treat them as a single citation. But it is a complication.

There was one more annoying wrinkle. Web of Science doesn’t separate out Noûs from Philosophical Issues and (usually) Philosophical Perspectives. As far as I could tell, every issue of Philosophical Issues is coded as a special issue of Noûs, and about half the issues of Philosophical Perspectives are. I wanted to get this noise out of the data. So when I was searching for Noûs I had to go through by hand and search just for those things that cited the real Noûs articles, not the ones citing the special issues. This wasn’t too hard, because the special issues had page numbers and/or issue numbers starting with ‘S’, but it was a bit of a pain. We’ll come back to that.

The result, after these 32 by 40 searches, was a file with roughly 240,000 citations in it. But a lot of these were citations in journals I wasn’t looking at. So I made a restricted file where the citations were just to the 32 journals I was looking at. This was mostly just a matter of filtering the large file by the citing journal, though again there was a bit of a pain filtering out the different things coded as ‘Noûs’. (It wasn’t too hard this time, to be honest, because the downloaded data about citing papers included issue and page number, so searching for things like ‘S’ got rid of most of them.) This was less automated than most of the process, so there was a higher chance of errors creeping in.

The result was a file with about 106,000 citations in it. The graph you saw above comes from a slightly smaller file, one that deletes all of the citations to articles in the same journal. That covers a lot of citations, so we’re now down to about 82,000 citations. Journals, it turns out, love publishing papers that cite other things in that very journal. For 24 journals, the journal they most frequently cite is themselves. For 7 others, it is Journal of Philosophy, and for 1, the Journal of Political Philosophy, it is Philosophy & Public Affairs. So we cut out a fair bit here.

I used that 82,000 strong list to build a 32 by 32 table, with the cited journal on the rows, and the citing journal on the columns. Each cell had a count of how often that pair showed up in the data set, from 0 (any number of times), to 1534 (citations by Sythese of Philosophy of Science). These are raw counts; so journals that publish a lot will naturally have bigger numbers (in both the rows and columns) than smaller journals. I’ll come back to this point in later posts; I’ve been working a fair bit this week on ways to address this.

Then I arranged the journals so that similar journals were nearby. I was using a fairly rough and ready version of similarity, and there were probably better ways to do this. There ended up being a big jump between the philosophy of science journals and the ethics journals, and a jump (though actually a bit smaller) between CJP in the generalist journals and the history journals.

It’s striking that it is possible to go by relatively small steps from the generalist journals to the philosophy of science journals, but not to the ethics journals. A large part of the explanation here is that Synthese exists as a bridge between the two, but no similar journal exists for bridging the ethics journals to the generalist journals. Economics and Philosophy sort of functions as such a bridge, since it connects to the political philosophy journals and the philosophy of science/formal epistemology journals, but it’s too small. Given the important of ethics-and-epistemology to young philosophers these days, I suspect that situation will change in the next few years.

There ends up being something like a category of ethics, aesthetics and history journals in the data set I have. This is not because these journals are all intrinsically similar. It is rather that they are all linked to Kant Studien.

Because Mind is linked to the other UK/Australian journals, and to Mind and Language, the UK/Australian journals ended up nearer to the specialist journals than the North American journals did. If I get a chance, I’d like to write more about the geographic patterns in the journals, because these are fairly interesting to me.

Then I had to colour code the journals. I went through a lot of options here before settling on what you see. I wanted nearby journals to get similar colours, while different categories to get very different colours, and the whole thing to not look terrible. And I would have liked to have very different colours for each journal, but I ended up having to seriously compromise on that. I landed on green for generalist journals, going through blue-ish greens for specialist journals in areas the generalists cover a lot, into darker blues and purples for philosophy of science, then jumping to reds for ethics and political, and oranges for aesthetics and for history. I alternated light/dark colours around the circle, but the light/dark doesn’t mean anything; it was just to make it easier to detect edges.

And I fed that table into Circos. The result is what you saw. Here’s how to read it.

Between each pair of (distinct) journals, there are a pair of lines. Each line starts on an outer ring and ends on an inner ring. The outer ring is the journal being cited, the inner ring is the journal doing the citing. The colour of the line is the colour of the journal being cited.

Around the edges there are three arcs, each with an array of colours. These represent the outbound citations, the inbound citations, and (on the outside) the sum of these. They are ordered by size. If the colours were more distinct, you could easily see which journal the particular journal interacts with the most. As it stands, looking for the purples, reds and browns on those arcs gives you a bit of a sense with how much the journal interacts with philosophy of science, with ethics, and with aesthetics/history. (Those colours usually come way towards the end of the arc, though Synthese obviously has more purple towards the top end.)

That’s about enough, I think, to show what’s going on. I have four big projects going forward.

  1. Building graphs that just highlight specific journals. It’s impossible to make out anything about the history journals, for instance, at the scale shown here. So I’ll in effect do some magnification.
  2. Building graphs (and perhaps gifs) that show the evolution over time of citation patterns. I might go back to some old fashioned line graphs to show the change in citation to various journals, and how much more egalitarian it has become.
  3. Looking at ways to highlight the geographical features of the citation patterns. This is something I’m really fascinated by.
  4. Figuring out the best way to normalise the data to account for the fact that some journals are bigger than others. I have some ideas here, but it’s a non-trivial challenge.