Vagueness as Meaning-Inconsistency

For months I’ve been thinking about writing a paper on the suddenly fashionable topic of _what vagueness is_. One of the most interesting views on the subject is by “Matti Eklund”:http://spot.colorado.edu/~eklundm/ivv.pdf who argues that a term is vague iff a tolerance principle is meaning-constitutive for it.

A tolerance principle is basically a Sorites premise. A tolerance principle is something like this, “Whereas large enough differences in F’s parameter of application sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.”

A principle is meaning-constitutive for a term if “if it is part of competence with it to be disposed to accept it.” (Both quotes are from Matti’s paper.)

I think that competence (in the sense of meaning the same thing as the rest of the linguistic community, which I think is the relevant sense of competence here) requires accepting very few principles, and certainly nothing as contentious as this. Note that Matti’s definition entails two other competence requirements, both of which I’ll argue against. First, being competent with vague term F requires knowing what F’s parameter of application is. Second, being competent with vague term F requires knowing that F is vague. Both of these might be plausible for _tall_ or _rich_, but they aren’t true, or even that plausible I think, for vague terms in general.

Consider the plausibly vague term _morally acceptable_. Imagine three speakers who have some thoughts about what is and isn’t morally acceptable. Tom thinks that an action is morally acceptable iff it is approved of by God. Jack thinks an action is morally acceptable iff produces more utils than any rival action would produce. And Mike thinks that an action is morally acceptable iff it’s an action a suitably virtuous person would perform.

It seems to me that Tom, Jack and Mike can all be competent users of the term _morally acceptable_. When they debate what things are morally acceptable, as they often do, they aren’t speaking past each other, rather they are genuinely contradicting what the others say. So they’re competent. But they don’t agree even on what kind of magnitude is measured by the term’s “parameter of application”. So the first competence principle is false.

As well as having very different views on what a tolerance principle for _morally acceptable_ should look like, they have very different views on whether such principles are prima facie plausible, let alone meaning-determining. Tom thinks no such principles are plausible, and certainly doesn’t think they are meaning-determining. Jack thinks that whether such principles are true turns on hard questions about the semantics and metaphysics of counterfactuals. But since he thinks hard questions about the semantics and metaphysics of counterfactuals don’t determine what’s meaning-determining for _morally acceptable_, these principles are not meaning-determining. Mike is more disposed to accept the prima facie plausibility of tolerance principles, though he too doesn’t think they are meaning-determining, since he thinks that if they were Jack and Tom would be conceptually confused (which he thinks they are not) rather than morally confused (which he thinks they are).

So I think Matti’s claim runs into trouble when we try to apply it to vague normative terms. But these are a _very large part_ of the class of vague terms.

UPDATE: Zoltan pointed out to me that Matti’s definition could be interpreted, and perhaps should be interpreted, as not requiring that competence requires knowing F’s parameter of application. Rather, it just requires being disposed to believe that whatever F’s parameter of application is, small changes in that parameter don’t change whether F applies. This seems to be correct, so one of my objections here fails. I still stand by the more general point that Tom, Jack and Mike can deploy the same concept while one believes it is vague and the other not, but my argument needs to be more careful here than I hinted at last night.

SECOND UPDATE: Matti responds at length in the comments. Be sure to read these as well.

An Odd Sentence

I’ve been away from the blog for a few days catching up on more important things in life (e.g. sleep). Maybe there’ll be a few more posts tonight though. Because this is the kind of sentence I never thought I’d read.

bq. In an important way, Priest’s view is _too moderate_. (Matti Eklund, “The Inconsistency View on Vagueness”:http://spot.colorado.edu/~eklundm/ivv.pdf, emphasis in original.)

That’s _Graham_ Priest he’s talking about, not some codesignated actual moderate. And it’s Graham’s view on contradictions he’s talking about, not Graham’s views on sexual perversion, or Hegel, or … well I guess this point doesn’t matter because Graham doesn’t have moderate views _on absolutely anything whatsoever_. (I really do mean that as a compliment. Really.)

Note to self: Dialethicism is not a moderate position, no matter what smart people say.

An Odd Sentence

I’ve been away from the blog for a few days catching up on more important things in life (e.g. sleep). Maybe there’ll be a few more posts tonight though. Because this is the kind of sentence I never thought I’d read.

bq. In an important way, Priest’s view is _too moderate_. (Matti Eklund, “The Inconsistency View on Vagueness”:http://spot.colorado.edu/~eklundm/ivv.pdf, emphasis in original.)

That’s _Graham_ Priest he’s talking about, not some codesignated actual moderate. And it’s Graham’s view on contradictions he’s talking about, not Graham’s views on sexual perversion, or Hegel, or … well I guess this point doesn’t matter because Graham doesn’t have moderate views _on absolutely anything whatsoever_. (I really do mean that as a compliment. Really.)

Note to self: Dialethicism is not a moderate position, no matter what smart people say.

Google Scholar

“Kai von Fintel”:http://semantics-online.org/blog/2004/11/google_scholar links to one of the newest (and coolest) toys in the toolbox.

bq. “Google Scholar”:http://semantics-online.org/blog/2004/11/google_scholar

It returns academic papers matching a search phrase you look for, ranked by number of citations. Hours and hours of fun to be had!

Talks at Cornell

We have two discussion club meetings scheduled at Cornell in the next 40 hours. They are:

* Yurii Cohen (Cornell), Revisiting Aristotle’s Function Argument: Moral Content on a Slender Basis? 7.30 tonight, 124 Goldwin Smith Hall
* Kris McDaniel (Syracuse), Kantian Ignorance. 4.30 tomorrow, 124 Goldwin Smith Hall.

Hopefully as many people as possible from the neighbourhood (broadly defined) will drop by.

UPDATE: As well as being a first-class philosophy, Kris is also a philosophical songsmith. Some of his efforts with _The Monads_ can be downloaded “here”:http://web.syr.edu/~krmcdani/themonads.html. For discussion: which of these songs should I play to ‘warm up’ the crowd before Kris’s talk tomorrow?

Academic Poverty

I was kinda kidding when I mentioned a few posts ago that I was earning *much* less than the typical expat. My household is well below the average household in salary, but also in size. But we full-time members of the Ivy League gravy train are doing pretty well. Of course I am writing from the office at 10.15 on a Wednesday night, because I’m here reading job files and grading. So the hours aren’t always the best. I like the vacation time though.

As “Matt Carter points out”:http://emanations.braininavat.net/archives/000156.html, for casual staff (I think what they call adjuncts in America, though I’m not sure if the parallel is exact) the situation is, er, not so good.

APA Conferences

The rotation for “APA Conferences”:http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divisions/schedule.html seems to be getting tighter. The Central is in Chicago for the next 2 years, and the Eastern is back in DC in 2006, just as it was in 2003. Personally I don’t mind this. I’d rather have the Pacific always in San Francisco, the Eastern always in Miami and the Central alternating between Chicago and New Orleans. (If I was a gambler I could imagine adding Las Vegas to the Central rotation, but as it is I’ll stick with Chicago and Nawlins.)

Papers Blog

Sorry about the lack of a “papers blog”:http://opp.weatherson.org yesterday. Real life intervened, in the form of my not having enough time in the morning to finalise my preparation for a class on counterfactuals and also do the papers blog. Given the relative size of the blog audience compared to the intro logic class it may have been utility-maximising to do the blog anyway. But for some reason I decided to obey duty rather than utility-maximise. Maybe I’m becoming a Kantian in my old age.

There are several interesting things on “today’s post”:http://opp.weatherson.org/archives/003971.html, perhaps the most notable being _seven_ new papers by “Matti Eklund”:http://spot.colorado.edu/%7Eeklundm/papers.htm. That’s as big as a decent tenure file, and it’s one day’s posting. (If I’d had time to read all seven I’m sure I’d say the quality is also as high as a decent tenure file, or even better, but I’m not that organised.) Very impressive!

These are Not Assertions

“Andrew Sullivan”:http://www.andrewsullivan.com/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_11_14_dish_archive.html#110057476215171285 reminds us of the low point of Colin Powell’s political career – his argument for war in Iraq at the UN. But I was struck by this quote.

bq. My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. *These are not assertions.* What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources. (Emphasis added.)

What exactly does the bolded line even mean? Two hypotheses come to mind. The most natural is that it’s a kind of metalinguistic negation. He means these aren’t *mere* assertions, in the way that when I say “I don’t _like_ cricket” I mean to say I don’t *merely* like it. (I wonder if the tape shows the phonetic patterns usually indicative of metalinguistic negation?) The more charitable is that Powell is telling the truth – he isn’t asserting anything at all. He’s an actor on a stage, or a puppet in a play, reciting lines, and just as actors and puppets don’t make assertions, he’s not making assertions either.

It’s interesting how little pressure there is here to adopt the most charitable reading. Note that even with the standard provisos added to the principle of charity, to turn it into something like a principle of humanity, still the principle-preferred interpretation is that he’s telling the truth in this sentence and this sentence only. But that’s not how we interpret him at all. If we did it might not be the low-point of his political career.

These are Not Assertions

“Andrew Sullivan”:http://www.andrewsullivan.com/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_11_14_dish_archive.html#110057476215171285 reminds us of the low point of Colin Powell’s political career – his argument for war in Iraq at the UN. But I was struck by this quote.

bq. My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. *These are not assertions.* What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources. (Emphasis added.)

What exactly does the bolded line even mean? Two hypotheses come to mind. The most natural is that it’s a kind of metalinguistic negation. He means these aren’t *mere* assertions, in the way that when I say “I don’t _like_ cricket” I mean to say I don’t *merely* like it. (I wonder if the tape shows the phonetic patterns usually indicative of metalinguistic negation?) The more charitable is that Powell is telling the truth – he isn’t asserting anything at all. He’s an actor on a stage, or a puppet in a play, reciting lines, and just as actors and puppets don’t make assertions, he’s not making assertions either.

It’s interesting how little pressure there is here to adopt the most charitable reading. Note that even with the standard provisos added to the principle of charity, to turn it into something like a principle of humanity, still the principle-preferred interpretation is that he’s telling the truth in this sentence and this sentence only. But that’s not how we interpret him at all. If we did it might not be the low-point of his political career.