This is a short post where I jot down my initial impressions of Jake Ross and Mark Schroeder’s interesting paper ”
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment”:http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~jacobmro/ppr/Belief_Credence_and_Pragmatic_Encroachment.pdf, and in particular how it compares to my views on belief and credence. I’m not going to summarise the paper, so this post won’t make a lot of sense unless you’ve read their paper too.
Continue reading →

Following up a little from “yesterday’s post”:, I think that many people on both sides of the IRI debate have misconstrued the force of IRI examples. For instance, here’s what Jason Stanley says is the take-home message of the examples.

bq. The advocate of IRI simply proposes that, in addition to whatever one’s favored theory of knowledge says about when _x_ knows at time _t_ that _p_, there is a further condition on knowledge that has to do with practical facts about the subject’s environment. (Knowledge and Practical Interests, pg. 85)

I think that’s wrong, or at least misleading, in a couple of respects. (And I think it’s trivial to say “when _x_ knows at time _t_ that _p_”; it’s at _t_ isn’t it?!)

• It suggests that interests are a “further condition” on knowledge, rather than integrated into the other conditions.
• It suggests, perhaps indirectly, that the ‘low stakes’ condition is the analytically basic condition, and there are extra conditions in ‘high stakes’ cases.

I’m not sure Jason commits to either of these claims, but I think critics of IRI have often taken those claims as being part of the theory, and I don’t think those critics are being entirely uncharitable when they do that. Be that as it may, I think both claims are false, and certainly neither claim is supported by examples motivating IRI. (Or, if you’re like me, by theoretical arguments motivating IRI; I don’t think the examples show a great deal.)

Here’s an alternative way to capture the motivations behind IRI that doesn’t endorse a “further conditions” view, and takes the ‘high stakes’ case to be analytically basic.

There are coherence constraints on knowledge. Violations of them amount to doxastic defeaters. Some of these constraints are simple. I think, for instance, the following constraint is plausibly a universal truth.

• If _x_ believes ¬_p_, then _x_ does not know that _p_.

It doesn’t matter whether _x_’s belief that _p_ is true, justified, safe, sensitive, not derived from falsehoods, caused by the truth of _p_, robust with respect to the addition of further true beliefs, or whatever you like. If _x_ believes both _p_ and ¬_p_, there is too much incoherence in that part of her belief space for there to be knowledge. The belief that ¬_p_ is a doxastic defeater of the (putative) knowledge that _p_.

There’s a motivation for this. Knowledge that _p_ should mean that adding _p_ to the cognitive state, and making the subsequent alterations that a good theory of belief revision suggests, would make no changes whatsoever. If _x_ knows _p_, then _p_ has been added. This suggests a further constraint.

• If _x_ prefers φ to ψ, but prefers ψ ∧ _p_ to φ ∧ _p_, she doesn’t know _p_.

In this case, however, the principle needs to be qualified. This seems to basically rule out anyone (rational) knowing _p_ unless _p_ is absolutely certain. (Proof sketch: Let ψ be the act of taking a bet on _p_ at crazy long odds, and φ be the act of declining that bet.) So we qualify the principle. How? IRI, or at least one version of it, says that the qualification is interest relative. So the real rule is something like this:

• If _x_ prefers φ to ψ, but prefers ψ ∧ _p_ to φ ∧ _p_, she doesn’t know _p_, unless one of φ and ψ is too irrelevant to _x_’s current interests.

The general picture is this. Knowledge that _p_ requires that one’s belief that _p_ sufficiently cohere with the rest of one’s cognitive state. Ideally, we’d like it to perfectly cohere. But requiring perfect coherence seems to lead to scepticism. So there is an exception clause. And it says that when you’re in a ‘low stakes’ context, certain restrictions on knowledge don’t apply. So a belief that doesn’t fully cohere can still be knowledge.

I think that makes better sense of how interests fit into knowledge. It isn’t that knowledge merely requires a belief with high utility. Or that changing one’s interests can be the basis for knowledge. It’s rather that certain barriers to knowledge get lowered in certain (relatively familiar) situations.

I’m in general sympathetic to approaches to knowledge that say that the sceptical scenario is the basic one, and the reason we have a lot of knowledge is because ‘exceptions’ to the rather tight restrictions on knowledge are frequently triggered. That is one way to explain the appeal of scepticism; abstract away too much from real-life situations and you lose the triggers for these exceptions, and then scepticism is true. The kind of lottery situations that IRI people worry about aren’t cases where strange new conditions on knowledge are triggered. Rather, they are cases where abstract Cartesian standards for knowledge are restored, just like they are in the simplest models for knowledge.

Jon Kvanvig has a “very puzzling objection”:http://el-prod.baylor.edu/certain_doubts/?p=2520 to interest-relative invariantism (IRI). He claims, I think, that IRI gets the wrong results in cases where there is a lot at stake, but the agent in question gains a lot.

But the objection is puzzling because I can’t even figure out why he thinks IRI has the consequences he says it has. Here’s what I take to be the distinctive claim of IRI.

Consider cases where the following is all true:

• The right thing to do given _p_ is X.
• The right thing to do given _Probably p_ is Y.
• The agent has a lot of evidence for _p_; sufficient evidence to know _p_ ceteris paribus.
• The agent faces a live choice between X and Y, and the right thing to do in the agent’s situation is Y.

In those cases, we say that the agent doesn’t know _p_. If they did know _p_, it would be right to do X. But it isn’t right to do X, so they don’t know _p_. And this is a form of interest-relativity, since if they were faced with different choices, if in particular the X/Y choice wasn’t live, they may well know _p_.

As Kvanvig notes, the usual way this is illustrated is with cases where the agent stands to lose a lot if they do X and ¬p is true. But that’s not necessary; here’s a similar case.

bq. S heard on the news that GlaxoSmithKline has developed a new cancer drug that will make billions of dollars in revenue, and that its share price has skyrocketed on the news. Intuitively, S knows that GSK’s share price is very high. Later that day, S is rummaging through his portfolio, and notices that he bought some call options on GSK at prices well below what he heard the current share price is. S is obviously extremely happy, and sets about exercising the options. But as he is in the process of doing this, he recalls that he occasionally gets drug companies confused. He wonders whether he should double check that it is really GSK whose price has skyrocketed, or whether he should just exercise the option now.

Here are the relevant X, Y and _p_.

X = Exercise the option.
Y = Spend 10 seconds checking a stock ticker to see whether it is worth exercising the option, then do so if it is, and don’t if it isn’t.
_p_ = GSK share price is very high.

Given _p_, X is better than Y, since it involves 10 seconds less inconvenience. Given _Probably p_, Y is better than X, since the only downside to Y is the 10 seconds spent checking the stock ticker. The downside of X isn’t great. If S buys shares that aren’t that valuable, he can always sell them again for roughly the same price, and just lose a few hundred dollars in fees. But since any reasonable doubt will make it worth spending 10 seconds to save a risk of losing a few hundred dollars, Y is really better than X.

So, I think, S doesn’t know that _p_. Once he knows that _p_, it makes sense to exercise the option. And he’s very close to knowing that _p_; a quick check of any stock site will do it. But given the fallibility of his memory, and the small cost of double-checking, he doesn’t really know.

So IRI works in cases where the agent stands to gain a lot, and not just where the agent stands to lose a lot. I haven’t seen any cases conforming to the template I listed above where IRI is clearly counter-intuitive. In some cases (perhaps like this one) some people’s intuitions are justly silent. But I don’t think there are any where intuition clearly objects to IRI.

As I’m sure everyone knows, it hasn’t been a great year for trying to get academic jobs in philosophy. And there are some several very good students (including some from Rutgers) who would normally have gotten good jobs with ease, but haven’t got anything this year. But in the midst of all that, a number of Rutgers students have done very well on the job market, and I wanted to congratulate them on their success.

So far, the following students at Rutgers have received tenure-track positions:

• Meghan Sullivan – Notre Dame
• Karen Lewis – USC
• Gabe Greenberg – UCLA
• Allison Hepola – Samford
• Jennifer Nado – Lingnan

The following students have post-docs:

• Carrie Swanson – Indiana
• Evan Williams – Purdue
• Luvell Anderson – Penn State

And these recent graduates have new tenure-track positions

• Christy Mag Uidhir- University of Houston
• Julie Yoo- CSU, Northridge

Well done to all of them, and to Jeff McMahan for a great job as placement director.

I believe that of the 7 tenure-track jobs at top 20 departments listed in on the “Leiter Reports hiring thread”:http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2011/03/tenure-track-and-postdoc-hiring-by-philosophy-departments-2010-11.html, 3 went to Rutgers students. So well done all. And hopefully there’s more good news to report before the market winds up for the year.

It’s been a while since I posted here, largely because the young one on the right has been taking up a fair amount of time. So here are a few bits of news.

1. Andy Egan and I have (very slowly) put together a collection of papers on epistemic modals and epistemic modality, and it is “coming out with OUP this spring”:http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Epistemology/?view=usa&view=usa&sf=toc&ci=9780199591589. The collection isn’t perfect; it should have come out ages ago, and contributor list is missing “a certain something”:http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/01/epistemic-modality-is-a-male-thing.html, but we hope it’s a valuable addition to the literature. I’ll hopefully write more about this closer to publication, especially about what I wish I’d done differently along the way to publication.
2. The “Philosophical Quarterly”:http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pq/ essay competition this year is on the topic of Hume after 300 years. There is a 1500 pound prize, so get your Hume papers ready.
3. “In Defence of a Kripkean Dogma”:http://brian.weatherson.org/IDKD.pdf is now available in “preprint on the PPR website”:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00478.x/abstract. Hopefully it will be in paper format soon!
4. There is a workshop on “Formal Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy”:http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilps/FEMEP2011/ at Tillberg University this Fall.
5. The “March 2011”:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phco.2011.6.issue-3/issuetoc issue of “Philosophy Compass”:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phco.2011.6.issue-3/issuetoc is out, with papers on truth in fiction, truthmaking, Leibniz’s Law, and many other fun topics.

Both “Matthew Yglesias”:http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/2011/01/the-great-stagnation/ and “Ben Goldacre”:http://bengoldacre.posterous.com/i-hope-this-is-the-beginning-of-more-short-bo had posts up today talking up the idea of short electronic books. (By short I mean something like 15000 to 25000 words.) Amazon is starting to promote this market with its “Kindle Singles”:http://www.amazon.com/b/ref=amb_link_355126882_3?ie=UTF8&node=2486013011&pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=hero-quick-promo&pf_rd_r=0DH80ZF8CR7BHSHNS7MA&pf_rd_t=201&pf_rd_p=1287272562&pf_rd_i=B004KSREFC collection. And it seems like a great idea, one that should be imported into philosophy.

There are a lot of philosophical works these days that naturally fit into the fifteen to twenty-five thousand word range. Some of them get published as is, in journals that are happy with long papers (such as Philosophical Review or Philosophers’ Imprint), or in edited collections. Some of them get padded out to make short books. And several of them get broken up into chunks and published disjointedly. (Note for instance that I recently posted “two”:http://brian.weatherson.org/DIRI.pdf “papers”:http://brian.weatherson.org/KBI.pdf on interest-relative invariantism; together they make one reasonably coherent 20000 word paper, but there’s really nowhere to publish that.)

Having an outlet for pieces that are too long for regular journals, but too short for books, would solve a lot of problems. As Amazon says in their promotion of Kindle Singles, we should look for ways in which a good idea can be “expressed at its natural length”. The mechanics of print publication, especially as it developed in the second half of the twentieth century, produced natural ways to publish ideas that were naturally expressed in under 15000 or over 40000 words, but left a large gap. Hopefully electronic publication can fill that gap.

It’s “here”:http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/BSPC/BSPC2011/BSPC_2011/Call_for_Papers.html.

It’s been a while since I posted one of these updates. There is a ton of interesting stuff in the links below.

Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art

Contemporary Finnish Aesthetics (volume 6, pages 1–10) – Arto Haapala
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00371.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(78K), References

The Philosophy of Creativity (volume 5, pages 1034–1046) – Berys Gaut
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00351.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(94K), References

Forgery and Appropriation in Art (volume 5, pages 1047–1056) – Darren Hudson Hick
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00353.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(80K), References

Epistemology

Epistemic Luck (volume 6, pages 11–21) – Joshue Orozco
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00365.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(80K), References

Judgment Aggregation (volume 6, pages 22–32) – Fabrizio Cariani
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00366.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(153K), References

The Ethics of Belief (volume 6, pages 33–43) – Berislav Marušić
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00368.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(84K), References

Ethics

The Normativity of Rationality (volume 5, pages 1057–1068) – Jonathan Way
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(84K), References

Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics (volume 5, pages 1069–1083) – Matthew S. Bedke
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00359.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(100K), References

History of Philosophy

A Wolff in Kant’s Clothing: Christian Wolff’s Influence on Kant’s Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology (volume 6, pages 44–53) – Corey W. Dyck
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00370.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(78K), References

The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller’s Critique of Kantian Rationalism (volume 5, pages 1084–1095) – Anne Margaret Baxley
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00350.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(95K), References

Aristotle’s Teleology (volume 5, pages 1096–1106) – Rich Cameron
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00354.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(86K), References

Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Metametaphysics: Idealism, Realism, and the Nature of Substance (volume 5, pages 871–879) – Brandon C. Look
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00338.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(75K), References

The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic (volume 5, pages 880–892) – Rachel Singpurwalla
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00343.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(93K), References

Legal & Political

Ethical Issues Surrounding Intellectual Property Rights (volume 5, pages 1107–1115) – Jorn Sonderholm
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00358.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(69K), References

Theories of Political Justification (volume 5, pages 893–903) – Simone Chambers
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00344.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(83K), References

W.E.B. Du Bois (volume 5, pages 904–915) – Paul C. Taylor
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00347.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(87K), References

Logic & Language

Probability Operators (volume 5, pages 916–937) – Seth Yalcin
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00360.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(140K), References

Metaphysics

Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism (volume 6, pages 54–64) – Sonia Roca-Royes
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00363.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(99K), References

Essential Properties and Individual Essences (volume 6, pages 65–77) – Sonia Roca-Royes
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00364.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(101K), References

Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary – Part I: The Indifference Approach (volume 5, pages 1116–1126) – Christopher J. G. Meacham
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00356.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(79K), References

Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary – Part II: The Regularity Approach (volume 5, pages 1127–1136) – Christopher J. G. Meacham
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00362.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(78K), References

The Metaphysics of Chance (volume 5, pages 938–952) – Rachael Briggs
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00345.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(219K), References

Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness (volume 5, pages 953–964) – Elizabeth Barnes
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00348.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(92K), References

Three Routes to Contingentism in Metaphysics (volume 5, pages 965–977) – Kristie Miller
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00349.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(90K), References

Mind & Cognitive Science

Olfactory Experience I: The Content of Olfactory Experience (volume 5, pages 1137–1146) – Clare Batty
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00355.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(132K), References

Olfactory Experience II: Objects and Properties (volume 5, pages 1147–1156) – Clare Batty
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00352.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(77K), References

Music, Emotions and the Influence of the Cognitive Sciences (volume 5, pages 978–988) – Tom Cochrane
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00337.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(82K), References

Metacognition (volume 5, pages 989–998) – Joëlle Proust
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00340.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(77K), References

Naturalistic Philosophy

What Experimental Evidence Shows Us about the Role of Emotions in Moral Judgement (volume 5, pages 999–1012) – Heidi Maibom
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00341.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(95K), References

Philosophy of Religion

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (volume 6, pages 78–89) – Omar Mirza
Article first published online: 4 JAN 2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00372.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(91K), References

The Later Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion (volume 5, pages 1013–1022) – Stig Børsen Hansen
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00339.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(78K), References

Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (volume 5, pages 1023–1033) – Stephen Minister and Jackson Murtha
Article first published online: 29 OCT 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00342.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(80K), References

Philosophy of Science

Symmetry and the Metaphysics of Physics (volume 5, pages 1157–1166) – David John Baker
Article first published online: 1 DEC 2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00361.x
Abstract, Full Article (HTML), PDF(84K), References

I am pleased to announce the imminent publication of the winning essay from the 2009 Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholars Prize: “Ontological Nihilism”, by Jason Turner (University of Leeds). It will be the lead article in Vol. 6 of OSM, due early 2011 from Oxford University Press. I am also happy to report that Karen Bennett and I are now co-editors of OSM; Karen has been breathing new life into the series, and the results will already be apparent with Vol. 6.

It is also time to remind all the younger metaphysicians out there that the due date for submission to the 2011 competition is fast approaching! It is NOT January 15 (as last OSM reported), but January 30. The winning essay will be published in OSM (often alongside runners-up) and the author receives an $8,000 prize. You still have a whole month in which to prepare your submissions. Get to it!

The competition is supported by the Ammonius Foundation — which supports a similar $8,000 award for the Younger Scholars Prize for Philosophical Theology, a parallel competition associated with Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (with a deadline of August 31). “Younger” metaphysicians and philosophers of religion (in grad school or within ten years of receiving a Ph.D.) should check out the details at: “http://www.ammonius.org/index.php”:http://www.ammonius.org/index.php.

Both prizes were dreamt up and are financed by the Ammonius Foundation. The Foundation’s grants have encouraged many younger metaphysicians with generous essay awards (past winners are Rachel Briggs, Graeme A. Forbes, Jason Turner, Jeff Russell, Bradford Skow, Stephan Leuenberger, Matthew McGrath, Cody Gilmore, and Thomas Hofweber), and more senior metaphysicians with individual research grants for projects in metaphysics and philosophy of religion (past recipients include Derek Parfit, Jonathan Schaffer, Mark Johnston, John Hawthorne, Alvin Plantinga, George Bealer, and Jan Cover).

If you just go to the main Ammonius Foundation web site, however, you won’t find any link to a really interesting, closely related page: “http://www.comingtounderstanding.com/”:http://www.comingtounderstanding.com/, the home of Coming to Understanding, the grand metaphysical system constructed by the founder of the Ammonius Foundation, Marc Sanders. The author, aka “Ammonius”, has developed an elaborate monistic, neo-platonic ontological scheme described in a (free!) downloadable book (which includes a critical essay by yours truly, and another by Gordon Graham). There are a lot of interesting ideas in his carefully crafted system, and the religious thrust of the book will resonate with those attracted to a deity like “the Highest One” of Mark Johnston’s recent book, Saving God. (After the manner of philosophers and junior high students, I show my respect for Ammonius’s system by relentlessly attacking it along multiple fronts.)

Marc Sanders is retiring from his role as head of the Ammonius Foundation, and passing the reins to his son, Eric Sanders, who plans to continue the two Younger Scholar Prize competitions, among other things. It has been a real privilege and pleasure to work with Marc and his Foundation over many years. Although Ammonius has a distinctive mission (“http://www.ammonius.org/mission.php”:http://www.ammonius.org/mission.php), much of what the Foundation does has no goal other than to promote serious work in metaphysics (and, now, philosophical theology), no matter the conclusions reached. The Foundation’s grants to the Younger Scholars program have been absolutely “no strings attached”; a committee of three judges, culled from editorial board members of OSM, makes the call, not me (committees have included Karen Bennett, Hud Hudson, Trenton Merricks, Ted Sider, Andrew Cortens, Yuri Balashov, and John Hawthorne, among others). I can’t imagine a pleasanter relationship with a grantor than mine with Ammonius.

As Marc steps down, I want to thank him publically for his steadfast support of excellence in metaphysics. But I know that public praise and attention is the last thing he wants — he wants our attention drawn, not to him, but to the ideas in his metaphysical system. So the only way I can adequately say “thanks” is to encourage you to check it out for yourself: “Coming to Understanding”:http://www.comingtounderstanding.com/.

— Dean Zimmerman

This is an open thread for people who want to discuss travel to the APA, and what’s happening there. I’ve turned off the spam filters to make commenting easier, though that might mean there’s more spam than usual.

Ishani is on two panels at the APA, but I’m only scheduled to go along to provide child care and moral support. As many of us as can go are planning to drive when the snow clears, though it’s (in some sense) not determined whether I’ll be going along, or staying home with the baby. When we go, we’re planning to drive up – largely so we can pack enough stuff for the baby. “Sigalert.com”:http://www.sigalert.com/Map.asp has a useful guide to how traffic is flowing on various roads, and it looks much better than I would have expected. I’m not sure if it’s reliable or not though.

There is a thread also running on “Feminist Philosophers”:http://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2010/12/26/sharing-information-about-the-apa/, with a couple of comments, so if you’ve got any useful info, it would be good to share it there as well.

Good luck everyone!

UPDATE: Unfortunately the session on Belief and Other Attitudes (Speakers: Richard Holton and Tamar Gendler; Commentator: Lynne Rudder Baker; Chair: Cheryl Chen), scheduled for tonight (Dec 27th) at 6:30pm “has been cancelled”:http://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2010/12/26/sharing-information-about-the-apa/#comment-29212.