NYU Hiring

In a move that might shock some in the philosophical community, NYU is about to _commence_ a hiring campaign.

bq. New York University is on a hiring campaign that it hopes will put its graduate and undergraduate liberal arts programs on sounder footing and give them the stature of some of its most prominent professional schools. Over the next five years, it plans to expand its 625-member arts and science faculty by 125 members, and replace another 125 who are expected to leave. (“New York Times”:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/27/education/27nyu.html?ex=1253937600&en=70320bbf92d34f3b&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland)

If hiring Ned Block, Hartry Field, Kit Fine, David Velleman etc etc was what they do in normal times, it could get a little scary to see what they do in an expansionary era.

Andy Egan on Relativism

“Andy Egan”:http://www.geocities.com/eganamit/papers.html, “Epistemic Modals, Relativism, and Assertion”:http://www.geocities.com/eganamit/might.doc

bq. I advocate a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as “the treasure might be under the palm tree”, according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a pair). Others have argued for relativist semantics in other areas. Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It’s easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and how to understand what we’d be up to in our use of sentences like “the treasure might be under the palm tree”, if they have such peculiar truth conditions.

bq. In what follows I will first present an example of the kind of case that motivates relativism about epistemic modals. (I’ll be talking about ‘might’, but nothing much hangs on this choice of examples. In fact, the intuitions that I’m appealing to are probably stronger for ‘probably’. So if you think I might be wrong about ‘might’, you’ll probably be happier to go along if you think about the parallel argument for ‘probably’ instead.) I’ll then sketch a relativist theory in a bit of detail. I’ll then show why there is a problem, given such a theory, about the role of epistemic modals in assertion and communication, and set out to solve it. Solving this problem will be helpful in several ways: not only does it eliminate an apparently forceful objection to relativism, but the account of the role of such claims in assertion and communication helps to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it’s interesting.

Stuff

No papers blog today because of an administrative snafu. (One of many administrative snafus around TAR headquarters it turns out.)

The spam attack only fully stopped when I found out how to IP block the addresses being used. Thanks to Will in comments for suggesting this. No feedback from choopa.com, who are hosting the spammers.

When things settle down here, I mean to write something substantive about the paper on moral relativism Jesse Prinz did here on Tuesday. So for now I’ll say two insubstantive things. First, it’s a little disturbing how many hidden indexicals there are meant to be in language these days. (Jesse is really a moral indexicalist, like Jamie Dreier, not a full-blown relativist.) Second, it’s amazing how much work the open question argument (and variants on it) has been thought to do over the last 100 years. It’s like _Bow down before me, for I am the Open Question Argument of Doom, and I can be used to derive Every anti-realist conclusion Ever Conceived_. That wasn’t quite how Jesse put it, indeed he didn’t describe his argument as a variant on the open question argument, though don’t know if he’d disagree with the claim that he was appealing to (inter alia) something lke the open question argument in his argument for relativism. Six months ago I thought of starting a serious study of Moore in order to have a better grip on what was going on with all these arguments, but it never really happened.

As I said, actual serious substantive comments to follow, because it was a very interesting paper and there’s lots to say.

Comment Spam

We just got an insane amount of spam from someone sending from IP address 64.237.52.18. If someone knows how to notify the internet service provider responsible for that address, and get them to stop hosting spammers, I’d be incredibly grateful.

Comment Spam

We just got an insane amount of spam from someone sending from IP address 64.237.52.18. If someone knows how to notify the internet service provider responsible for that address, and get them to stop hosting spammers, I’d be incredibly grateful.

Another Knowledge Thought Experiment

Most intuition checks in epistemology involve made-up cases rather than found cases. The lottery cases may be an exception, but I think we should have a few more. Here’s my current favourite.

Consider Hamlet as he stands at “the end of Act I”:http://the-tech.mit.edu/Shakespeare/hamlet/hamlet.1.5.html. Does he know, or if you like _know_, that his uncle murdered his father? Let’s review the case for and against.

On the pro side, he has testimonial evidence, and the provider of the testimony presumably has first-hand evidence of the murderous act. So there’s a causal chain from the act leading to Hamlet. And that should usually do.

On the other hand, and it’s a big other hand, it’s a ghost. This is not the standard kind of testimony we’re talking about.

There are a couple of textual points that seem relevant. Hamlet seems at least a little familiar with ghosts, which might matter if one thinks, for instance, that internal justification of the evidence matters. On the other hand, it isn’t really made clear in the text just _how_ the King knows how he was murdered. As he says,

bq. Thus was I, sleeping, by a brother’s hand
Of life, of crown, of queen, at once dispatch’d:

So maybe the causal chain here doesn’t stretch straight back to the actual killing, but to when (in the afterlife?) the King found out about his method of murder. So it’s all a bit messy.

And if one is a two-dimensionalist about justification it will turn out that Hamlet clearly does not have a justified belief, because lectures from ghosts are not _actually_ a reliable source of evidence.

There’s a Williamsonian point coming behind all this. Possibly it’s a little hard to say whether Hamlet knows at the end of Act I whether his uncle murdered his father. Perhaps he does, perhaps he doesn’t. But the question of whether he does or not is not a distinctively philosophical question, nor even a distinctively _conceptual_ question. We’re just asking what the state of play is at that stage of the story. It’s just the same kind of question as if we ask whether Laertes knows at the end of act IV that Hamlet killed _his_ father. (Yes, I think, though I can sort of imagine an argument to the contrary, what with Claudius having a vested interest in having Laertes come to believe it was Hamlet.) There’s no _generalised_ ground for scepticism about the judgement about Hamlet that doesn’t extend to scepticism about the judgement about Laertes. And that seems preposterous – very often we know exactly what characters in plays do and don’t know. Someone who wants to argue that we _could not_ know, or even have justified beliefs about, whether Hamlet knows how his father died at the end of Act I has to appeal, in some way or other, to facts particular to the case. That’s not a lesson I’ve always followed in the past, and it undermines some of my pro-JTB arguments.

Northwest Philosophy Cnference

The program for the “Northwest Philosophy Conference”:http://facweb.bcc.ctc.edu/wpayne/program.htm is online with many of the papers being accessible. Sadly Michael O’Rourke’s enticingly titled paper _Mmm…Pudding!_ is not one of the linked papers, though maybe that will be fixed in the near future. As of a few hours ago there were still some commentary slots open though I imagine they’ll fill up quickly, so if you’re interested contact the organisers.

Vagueness Experiment Results

If anyone still wants to take the experiment, the “experiment”:http://brian.weatherson.org/vagtest2/n2.htm is here. After 235 submissions, “here are the interim results”:http://brian.weatherson.org/vagtest2/thankyou.htm. (The link by the way is to the page that currently shows after you take the test.)

Williamson on Intuition

It turns out one of the Williamson papers I linked to the other day contains an argument that I had been (for somewhat independent reasons) running in Tamar’s seminar on Tuesday night. Here’s the position Williamson is arguing against, and that I was also opposing last Tuesday.

bq. “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement”:http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0009/files/intuit3.pdf

bq. The result is the uneasy conception which many contemporary analytic philosophers have of their own methodology. They think that, in philosophy, our ultimate evidence consists only of intuitions. Under pressure, they take that not to mean that our ultimate evidence consists of the mainly non-psychological putative truths that are the contents of those intuitions. Rather, they take it to mean that our ultimate evidence consists of the psychological truths that we have intuitions with those contents, whether true or false. That is, our ultimate evidence in philosophy amounts only to psychological facts about ourselves.

Williamson goes on to run through some of the reasons this line is wrong, and some responses to defences of it.. Again, much the same thing happened in the seminar, with me somewhat inexpertly playing the Williamson role, perhaps without the required conviction to be fully convincing. So I was a little surprised, though I shouldn’t have been, to find the person cited as being most guilty of this kind of approach as being _me_, particularly me qua author of “this paper”:http://brian.weatherson.org/counterexamples.pdf. It’s not an unfair reading of the paper on Tim’s part, quite the opposite, so this isn’t a complaint about Tim’s citation. In fact being unfavourably cited by the great and the good beats being ignored every day so I’m not complaining a bit. But it seemed like an apt opportunity to explore the issue a bit.
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