In the last four weeks I’ve been to two epistemology conferences on (or about) the west coast – the INPC conference _Knowledge and Scepticism_ at Washington State/Idaho, and _Formal Epistemology_, or FEW, at Berkeley. First a couple of quick sociological notes.
The male/female ratio at each conference was about 5:1. I might have mentioned this before, but epistemology, formal or informal, seems to be the least gender-balanced of all subfields of philosophy.
Last fall there were two philosophy of language conferences on the east coast with minimal overlap between the attendees. And the same thing has happened with the two west coast(ish) epistemology conferences. I was the only person at both INPC and FEW. Now this was in part coincidental. Some of the people at INPC (such as John Pollock or Jonathan Schaffer) could easily have fitted in at FEW. And plenty of people at FEW do stuff with a tight enough connection to traditional epistemology that they could have fitted in nicely at INPC. Peter Vranas and Sherri Roush are the most obvious candidates for this, but many of the philosophers of science and probabilists there would have had useful things to say to the traditional epistemologists.
In fact, it was too bad that there wasn’t more mixing between the groups, because they could learn a lot from each other. The advances in formal methods in recent years are really quite stunning.
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