Unless

I was chatting with Chris Hill and Michael Pace yesterday about unless, and I wasn’t really having much luck convincing them that it didn’t mean if not. So I thought I’d see if my loyal readership were any easier to convince.

For the following case, imagine that I have two boxes in front of me, a red box and a black box. The red box contains 19 red marbles and 1 black marble. The black box contains 19 black marble and 1 red marble. I am going to choose a box at random and then choose a marble from it at random. Do you think the following sentences are definitely true, probably true, probably false or definitely false? (Or something else?)

(1) I will draw a red marble unless I choose the black box.

(2) I will draw a red marble if I choose the red box.

(Make sure you’ve decided what you think before reading on.)

I think that (2) is probably true, but (1) is definitely false. So unless I choose the black box does not mean the same thing as if I choose the red box. I assume that in context choose the red box is the negation of choose the black box. Anyway, that didn’t convince either Chris or Michael, which is sad because it’s clearly a sound argument.

Let’s try a different argument then. In front of me there is a wall of beer bottles. Some of them are Guinness bottles, which are black. Some of them are Dos Equis bottles, which are clear. (Actually, they are brown-ish, but let’s call them clear for convenience.) Beer bottles as far as the eye can see. Well, except for a fake Guinness bottle somewhere hidden in the wall. If I were looking at the fake bottle, I would think it were a real bottle. The fake bottle is a fair way from where I am looking at in the wall. I am actually looking at a Guinness bottle, but there are lots of clear Dos Equis bottles around it.

Anyway, what do we think of (3) through (6)?

(3) If I were not looking at a beer bottle, I would not believe I were looking at a beer bottle.
(4) If I were not looking at a black beer bottle, I would not believe I were looking at a black beer bottle.
(5) I would not believe I were looking at a beer bottle unless I were looking at a beer bottle.
(6) I would not believe I were looking at a black beer bottle unless I were looking at a black beer bottle.

On Lewis’s theory of conditionals, (3) is true and (4) is false. But it is very implausible, I think, that (5) is true and (6) is false. So perhaps that’s another argument that unless is not if not.

Unless

I was chatting with Chris Hill and Michael Pace yesterday about unless, and I wasn’t really having much luck convincing them that it didn’t mean if not. So I thought I’d see if my loyal readership were any easier to convince.

For the following case, imagine that I have two boxes in front of me, a red box and a black box. The red box contains 19 red marbles and 1 black marble. The black box contains 19 black marble and 1 red marble. I am going to choose a box at random and then choose a marble from it at random. Do you think the following sentences are definitely true, probably true, probably false or definitely false? (Or something else?)

(1) I will draw a red marble unless I choose the black box.

(2) I will draw a red marble if I choose the red box.

(Make sure you’ve decided what you think before reading on.)

I think that (2) is probably true, but (1) is definitely false. So unless I choose the black box does not mean the same thing as if I choose the red box. I assume that in context choose the red box is the negation of choose the black box. Anyway, that didn’t convince either Chris or Michael, which is sad because it’s clearly a sound argument.

Let’s try a different argument then. In front of me there is a wall of beer bottles. Some of them are Guinness bottles, which are black. Some of them are Dos Equis bottles, which are clear. (Actually, they are brown-ish, but let’s call them clear for convenience.) Beer bottles as far as the eye can see. Well, except for a fake Guinness bottle somewhere hidden in the wall. If I were looking at the fake bottle, I would think it were a real bottle. The fake bottle is a fair way from where I am looking at in the wall. I am actually looking at a Guinness bottle, but there are lots of clear Dos Equis bottles around it.

Anyway, what do we think of (3) through (6)?

(3) If I were not looking at a beer bottle, I would not believe I were looking at a beer bottle.
(4) If I were not looking at a black beer bottle, I would not believe I were looking at a black beer bottle.
(5) I would not believe I were looking at a beer bottle unless I were looking at a beer bottle.
(6) I would not believe I were looking at a black beer bottle unless I were looking at a black beer bottle.

On Lewis’s theory of conditionals, (3) is true and (4) is false. But it is very implausible, I think, that (5) is true and (6) is false. So perhaps that’s another argument that unless is not if not.

Among the many areas in

Among the many areas in philosophy where I wish I had an opinion (not necessarily the true opinion, but preferably a defensible and idiosyncratic one) is the debate about particularism vs universalism about norms. I have this little dream that after the ethicists have sorted out all the issues, but before the epistemologists have noticed that they have, I can make a quick buck translating all the ethics papers into epistemology and looking like I’m doing cutting edge work on epistemic values. Since I have that dream, I probably shouldn’t go round promoting good papers on moral particularism, but I will anyway.

Particularism and Default Reasons by Pekka Väyrynen

ABSTRACT. Moral particularism says that what descriptive non-moral facts function as moral reasons is determined not by general moral principles, but on a fundamentally case-by-case basis. This paper addresses the recent suggestion that particularists can extend their view to countenance presumptive or default reasons – reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined – by relying on certain background expectations of normality (Cullity 2002). Drawing on discussions of normality, and of generic statements, I argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus we cannot assume that if being a default reason rests on some normality claims, those claims bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. The extensional generality of moral reasons depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world. Such contingent matters play no role in the normative grounding of reasons for action, so appeals to them cannot decide between generalism and particularism. Therefore, appeals to default reasons cannot uniquely support particularism. Moreover, since the extensional generality of reasons turns out to be the sort of contingent matter that no theory of reasons purports to decide on its own, generalism would be a non-starter if it were committed to the existence of reasons whose moral valence is invariant regardless of the context (which is a typical extensional characterization). Since generalism is not a non-starter, we must rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. I outline the sort of generalism that I think is suggested by my discussion and sketch a generalist account of default reasons that doesn’t depend on normality claims.

Looks like there will already be lots for tomorrow’s philosophy papers blog.

distinguished

I thought this, the latest Leiter mailing, was fairly amusing. (My emphasis throughout).

(1) Tamar Szabo Gendler (epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology), currently at Syracuse University, has accepted the tenured offer from Cornell, to begin fall 2004. In addition, Zoltan Gendler Szabo at Cornell has turned down the offer from NYU Linguistics and Philosophy.

(2) The rational choice theorist and political philosopher Edward McClennen, who is currently LSE Centennial Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics, has accepted a senior offer from Syracuse University, with a joint appointment in the Department of Philosophy and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

(3) The eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison, currently at Boston University, will leave BU to take up a half-time appointment at the University of California at Davis beginning in fall 2004. Allison is also an emeritus professor at the University of California at San Diego.

(4) The distinguished political and legal philosopher Leslie J. Green will now be a regular visiting professor of law *and* philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, beginning in Spring 2004. (He had already been part-time in the law school at Texas.) The rest of the time Green is at York University, Toronto.

(5) Berkeley has made tenured offers to John Campbell, the Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy at Oxford, and Alva Noe (philosophy of mind) at the University of California at Santa Cruz. Noe also has offers from Tufts University and York University, Toronto.

If Eddie and Leslie and distinguished, and Hank is eminent, what are Tamar, Zoltan, John and Alva? Chopped liver? Seriously, losing Tamar is a big loss for Syracuse (and a big gain for Cornell), but the news about McClennen is a positive for a couple of reasons. The Maxwell school at Syracuse is very strong, and it makes sense to try and be as attached to it as possible.

Leiter also notes that an illegal invasion of Iraq is about to take place.

A question about speaker meaning

A question about speaker meaning and semantic meaning. (I probably should know the answer to this, but what are blogs for except for revealing one’s ignorance?) Consider the following little passage, taken perhaps from a discussion of the evolution wars:

Creationists believe that contemporary biology is founded on a giant mistake. Humans were created directly by God in His own image. They are not descended from other primates.

I know what the speaker meaning of the last sentence is: Creationists believe that humans are not descended from other primates. But is that the semantic meaning of the sentence, or is the semantic meaning simply that Humans are not descended from other primates? Or is the semantic meaning just a propositional radical The xs are not descended from other primates?

I generally assume speaker meanings and semantic meanings are identical unless there is a good reason to say otherwise, so I am inclined to think they are the same here, but there are some pretty good authorities saying this is very foolish of me.

I have a pile of

I have a pile of grading to do, so naturally I’d rather be thinking of something else. In particular, I’d rather be thinking of intentionalist theories of truth in fiction. The following is rather speculative even by blog standards, but I think the cases are a little amusing at least.

The clearest, and most accessible, of the theories I’m interested in here is presented in Alex Byrne’s Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued (AJP 93). (Do you think that if I keep writing about old papers they will magically appear online?!)

In it true in fiction F that p iff the Reader could infer that the Author in inviting the reader to make-believe that p.

Similar proposals have been made by Walton and Currie. For some purposes the differences between the proposals will matter, but I’m not sure that this is one of them. What’s interesting about these kinds of cases is that they have a hope of explaining the many and varied ways in which fictional works can be unreliable. Currie in particular has done some nice work outlining the flexibility that’s available here. And since I think unreliability is the most important issue for a theory of truth in fiction to explain, that means these theories deserve pretty close attention. (I think even those theories can’t explain why moral claims in the story are unreliable, even when those claims match with the author’s view and intents, but that’s for another day. I suspect the right thing to say here is related to what we say about Hamlet and computer databases and evolution.)

One kind of worry is that these accounts will overgenerate for certain complex fictions. We’ll start with something that isn’t a counterexample, then move on to some things that might be. The Reader of Animal Farm is meant to make-believe that some pigs take over a farm and then become corrupt and turn on those who helped them to power. She is also meant to believe that this, in broad outlines, is the story of Stalin’s Russia. But it is not true in the story that Stalin had turned on the workers who had assisted him to power. No worries though – this is something the Reader is invited to believe, not just to makebelieve.

But what happens if our story is related not to the world in this way, but to other stories? The simplest example would be a story that is an allegory, perhaps not quite as crude as Animal Farm, for other works of fiction. So imagine the following kind of story. (I’m sure this could be written, and I’m also sure that I could not write it.) The story appears to be about four contemporary American businessmen sitting around a bar in Hell bemoaning their fate. After a while, it becomes clear that the stories of each of the four characters resembles that of a Shakespearean character. So one resembles Hamlet, another Macbeth, another Lear and the fourth Othello. It is never suggested that the people are Hamlet or Macbeth etc, but the parallels in their stories are striking. Then in the final act we learn quite a bit more about the inner lives of these characters. It wasn’t true that the allegoric duplicate of Hamlet, call him Hal, learned that his uncle killed his father when he saw his father’s ghost. Rather, Hal killed his own father, and the ghost was a distorted manifestation of his conscience. (This may be revealed after a troubling conversation with McBride, the second businessman.) It is clear, I think that the Author of this story is inviting the Reader to at least consider, and perhaps to adopt, a striking interpretation of Hamlet. But to think about Hamlet is just to make-believe that it is true, and then examine the details of what is being make-believed. So I think the Author of this work is inviting the Reader to make-belive that Hamlet, like Hal, killed his father. But while it is true in the fiction that Hal killed his father, it is not true in the fiction that Hamlet killed his father. Indeed, it might not even be true in the fiction that Hamlet exists, or even that Hamlet does.

Perhaps this is just a technical problem that can be fixed by tidying-up the concept of make-believe that is at issue. Perhaps it will turn out, on careful consideration, that the Author of this allegory is not inviting the Reader to make-believe that Hamlet killed his father, but to make-believe that she make-believes it, or something. Or there may be some other way that we can reflect the fact that this invitation is in some way embedded in the fiction, while the invitation to make-believe that Hal killed his father is constitutive of the fiction. I can’t see how to do this immediately, but it feels like a solvable puzzle in principle.

If it is to be solved, note some other cases, or one other case considered twice over, that must also be dealt with. In the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ episode of Ulysses, Joyce parodies a succession of writers from the history of English literature. Not all of the parodies are entirely disrespectful – he means the Reader to see his story in a new way by looking at it through the prism of historical styles, as well as seeing something about the styles by seeing them applied to a contemporary story. One of the first targets is Mallory. So we have Joyce writing the following:

This meanwhile this good sister stood by the door and begged them at the reverence of Jesu our alther liege Lord to leave their wassailing for there was above one quick with child, a gentle dame whose time hied fast. Sir Leopold heard on the upfloor cry on high and he wondered what cry that it was whether of child or woman and I marvel, said he, that it be not come or now. Meseems it dureth overlong. And he was ware and saw a franklin that hight Lenehan on that side the table that was older than any of the tother and for that they both were knights virtuous in the one emprise and eke by cause that he was elder he spoke to him full gently. But, said he, or it be long too she will bring forth by God His bounty and have joy of her childing for she hath waited marvellous long. And the franklin that had drunken said, Expecting each moment to be her next. Also he took the cup that stood tofore him for him needed never none asking nor desiring of him to drink and, Now drink, said he, fully delectably, and he quaffed as far as he might to their both’s health for he was a passing good man of his lustiness. And sir Leopold that was the goodliest guest that ever sat in scholars’ hall and that was the meekest man and the kindest that ever laid husbandly hand under hen and that was the very truest knight of the world one that ever did minion service to lady gentle pledged him courtly in the cup. Woman’s woe with wonder pondering.

I think that the Reader here is meant to make-believe, among other things, that Leopold is an Arthurian knight. That’s not because he is an Arthurian knight, even in the story, but because by make-believing it the Reader gets a better appreciation of exactly what kind of early 20th Century Irishman he is. Maybe this isn’t true make-believe, but rather some different kind of imaginative activity, but I think some work is needed to say exactly how the relevant kinds of make-believe are to be separated. In my allegory I had the story saying something about another story. Here Joyce uses another story to say something about his story, but without I think making anything about the other story be true in his. Bloom never leaves 16 June 1904 after all, and certainly does not leave it for Arthurian times.

Oxen of the Sun is problematic for intentionalist theories for another reason, but here intuitions may really be starting to fade out. There are, I am reliably told, three layers to the story going on here. As well as telling the story of an hour of 16 June 1904, and telling the story of the history of English literature, Joyce is also telling the story of the gestation of a foetus. Each of the nine (not clearly demarcated) sections of the chapter is the story of a month of the gestation. Now one may wonder why one would want to do all these things at once, or even whether Joyce entirely succeeded, but scholarly opinion is that he did. So I think one Reader at least is meant to make-believe that a foetus gestates throughout the chapter. But it isn’t true in Oxen of the Sun that a foetus gestates, except perhaps for the little gestation of Mrs Purefoy’s. So I think we shall eventually need to restrict the intentionalist story in some way to stop the foetal story being part of what is true in Ulysses. How to do this without losing some of the ability to deal with unreliable texts, I have no idea. If I had a spare year or two to work this out…

In San Francisco I’m


In San Francisco I’m going to be one of the commentators on Henry Jackman’s paper Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness.
I won’t exactly be reading the comments out, but I always like to have a text prepared so I can have a sense of how long it will take to say the things I want to say. So here is the draft of the text of my comments.
Sometimes I think wheeling out Joyce in a defence of individualism about content (which is one of the things I do in the comments) is really not playing fair. So I should make it clear that the second-half of the comments, where I relate this all specifically to what Henry says about vagueness, is where the philosophical action is. Also note that there are no references, because I don’t really think they’re needed in what are meant to be fairly informal comments.
I think I make it clear enough in the text where I’m drawing most of the key ideas from, but normally I think the citations would need to be more rigorous than they are here.