Big crop of papers in the philosophy papers blog today, in part because I got lazy and decided to list papers that had been posted as much as 36 hours ago on the site.

As the title suggests, this post consists of two questions about chairs. I’m back towards thinking that I have a solution, of sorts, to the problem of imaginative resistance (not the solution I proposed in the stages paper), but it turns on some questions about chairs being answered in the right kind of way. So here are the questions.

A, B and C visit a new design showroom. Many of the objects there are hard to classify into particular categories. One of them, x, is somewhat, but not quite entirely, like a chair. A thinks it is a chair, though B and C deny this. (Presumably it is possibly indeterminate whether x is a chair, but none of them think this.)

When they are asked to draw, from memory, what x looked like, A and B produce identical drawings, but C produces a drawing that is quite different. (A, B and C are all skilled draughters, so their sketches faithfully reproduce their memories.) It seems that B disagrees with both A and C. She disagrees with C about what the object looked like, what shape it was etc, and with A about whether it is a chair.

Question: How should we characterise the two differences of opinion?

I think, somewhat tendentiously, that A and B agree on the facts, but make a different judgment about the facts, while B and C disagree about the facts. This is tendentious, not to mention controversial, because it is clearly a fact (if it is true) that x is a chair. It is not as if A and B agree on the physical description of a certain action but disagree about whether it is right or wrong, for instance. It is at least controversial whether that kind of dispute even could be factual. My claim is that the chair case is not like that, and getting clear on the differences between B’s two disagreements helps see that.

More generally, I think that if x is F (or not) entirely in virtue of which determinate properties from the determinables D1, D2, …, Dn it possesses, and A and B agree about which determinate in each such determinable it possesses, then disagreement between A and B about whether x is F should be thought of as a disagreement about a matter of judgment, not a factual disagreement. And I think x is a chair (or not) in virtue of its shape and size, and perhaps whether it is maximal, and perhaps its origin and the intent of its creators, and perhaps the physical nature of the community in which the object is embedded. (Something that is not a chair here may be a chair in a community where everyone is 1000m tall.) I assume that in this case x was created with the right intent to be a chair, and is maximal, and that A and B agree more or less on the relevant socio-physiological facts that are relevant to whether x is a chair. And by hypothesis they agree on its shape and size. So their disagreement is not a factual disagreement, in some sense.

The claims in the previous paragraph turn crucially on the term in virtue of, and it would be nice to know a little more about this. So some more questions.

Consider the chair in which I am now sitting. (You presumably were not antecedently aware of this chair.) I think it is a chair in virtue of its shape. But it does not have its shape in virtue of being a chair? What explains the asymmetry here? (I presume this is a well worked field and I’m simply ignorant of the tillings, but ignorance has never stopped a blogger before.)

I think the answer here should relate to the literature on superdupervenience. Here are two kinds of claims that may be relevant to explaining the asymmetry. First, if we changed the shape of the chair a little, it would still be a chair, but if we changed its chairness, it would probably not retain its shape – depending perhaps on how we made it cease to be a chair. Secondly, it could have a radically different shape and still be a chair, but it could not be a radically different type of furniture and still have the shape it does. It could not be a bed, for instance, with just this shape. Both of these ground a kind of asymmetry between the shape properties of the chair and the furniture properties. I’m inclined to think the second is more important, but I might leave my comments on why it is more important to the morning.

So here’s my latest theory of imaginative resistance. The author’s job is to tell us what the facts are about the fictional world. (She is also obliged to do this as artistically as possible, I say, but we’re trying to ignore aesthetics here.) The reader’s job is to evaluate, or more broadly make judgments about, the fictional world. Once the facts in virtue of which some higher-level fact obtains (or not) are set, questions about whether that higher-level fact obtains become in the relevant sense judgment questions, not factual questions, so they are in the domain of the reader, not the author. Hence we will reject authorial authority in these areas. The resistance to moral claims is a special case: moral facts are (very) high level facts that obtain in virtue of lower level facts, and resistance normally arises when the lower level facts are given, but the author nevertheless insists on recording a judgment about the higher level, moral facts.

To make this a complete theory, I need to say a little more about levels, which in turn requires filling out the ‘in virtue of’ locution. And I need to say a little about how this interacts with the possibility of impossible fictions. And I may need to say a little about the division of fictional labour presumed above. But I’m feeling as confident as one ought feel at this hour that we’re making progress here, perhaps more so.

As the title suggests, this post consists of two questions about chairs. I’m back towards thinking that I have a solution, of sorts, to the problem of imaginative resistance (not the solution I proposed in the stages paper), but it turns on some questions about chairs being answered in the right kind of way. So here are the questions.

A, B and C visit a new design showroom. Many of the objects there are hard to classify into particular categories. One of them, x, is somewhat, but not quite entirely, like a chair. A thinks it is a chair, though B and C deny this. (Presumably it is possibly indeterminate whether x is a chair, but none of them think this.)

When they are asked to draw, from memory, what x looked like, A and B produce identical drawings, but C produces a drawing that is quite different. (A, B and C are all skilled draughters, so their sketches faithfully reproduce their memories.) It seems that B disagrees with both A and C. She disagrees with C about what the object looked like, what shape it was etc, and with A about whether it is a chair.

Question: How should we characterise the two differences of opinion?

I think, somewhat tendentiously, that A and B agree on the facts, but make a different judgment about the facts, while B and C disagree about the facts. This is tendentious, not to mention controversial, because it is clearly a fact (if it is true) that x is a chair. It is not as if A and B agree on the physical description of a certain action but disagree about whether it is right or wrong, for instance. It is at least controversial whether that kind of dispute even could be factual. My claim is that the chair case is not like that, and getting clear on the differences between B’s two disagreements helps see that.

More generally, I think that if x is F (or not) entirely in virtue of which determinate properties from the determinables D1, D2, …, Dn it possesses, and A and B agree about which determinate in each such determinable it possesses, then disagreement between A and B about whether x is F should be thought of as a disagreement about a matter of judgment, not a factual disagreement. And I think x is a chair (or not) in virtue of its shape and size, and perhaps whether it is maximal, and perhaps its origin and the intent of its creators, and perhaps the physical nature of the community in which the object is embedded. (Something that is not a chair here may be a chair in a community where everyone is 1000m tall.) I assume that in this case x was created with the right intent to be a chair, and is maximal, and that A and B agree more or less on the relevant socio-physiological facts that are relevant to whether x is a chair. And by hypothesis they agree on its shape and size. So their disagreement is not a factual disagreement, in some sense.

The claims in the previous paragraph turn crucially on the term in virtue of, and it would be nice to know a little more about this. So some more questions.

Consider the chair in which I am now sitting. (You presumably were not antecedently aware of this chair.) I think it is a chair in virtue of its shape. But it does not have its shape in virtue of being a chair? What explains the asymmetry here? (I presume this is a well worked field and I’m simply ignorant of the tillings, but ignorance has never stopped a blogger before.)

I think the answer here should relate to the literature on superdupervenience. Here are two kinds of claims that may be relevant to explaining the asymmetry. First, if we changed the shape of the chair a little, it would still be a chair, but if we changed its chairness, it would probably not retain its shape – depending perhaps on how we made it cease to be a chair. Secondly, it could have a radically different shape and still be a chair, but it could not be a radically different type of furniture and still have the shape it does. It could not be a bed, for instance, with just this shape. Both of these ground a kind of asymmetry between the shape properties of the chair and the furniture properties. I’m inclined to think the second is more important, but I might leave my comments on why it is more important to the morning.

So here’s my latest theory of imaginative resistance. The author’s job is to tell us what the facts are about the fictional world. (She is also obliged to do this as artistically as possible, I say, but we’re trying to ignore aesthetics here.) The reader’s job is to evaluate, or more broadly make judgments about, the fictional world. Once the facts in virtue of which some higher-level fact obtains (or not) are set, questions about whether that higher-level fact obtains become in the relevant sense judgment questions, not factual questions, so they are in the domain of the reader, not the author. Hence we will reject authorial authority in these areas. The resistance to moral claims is a special case: moral facts are (very) high level facts that obtain in virtue of lower level facts, and resistance normally arises when the lower level facts are given, but the author nevertheless insists on recording a judgment about the higher level, moral facts.

To make this a complete theory, I need to say a little more about levels, which in turn requires filling out the ‘in virtue of’ locution. And I need to say a little about how this interacts with the possibility of impossible fictions. And I may need to say a little about the division of fictional labour presumed above. But I’m feeling as confident as one ought feel at this hour that we’re making progress here, perhaps more so.

Via David Chalmers, two sites that you might be interested in following, and that I shall be tracking via the philosophy papers blog.

First, the philosophy page at thematrix.com currently includes papers by Dave Chalmers, Jim Pryor, Richard Hanley, Colin McGinn, Julian Driver and several other philosophers.

Secondly, the NYU seminar on Factually Questionable Discourse has plenty of links to papers on, well, factually defective discourse.

Via David Chalmers, two sites that you might be interested in following, and that I shall be tracking via the philosophy papers blog.

First, the philosophy page at thematrix.com currently includes papers by Dave Chalmers, Jim Pryor, Richard Hanley, Colin McGinn, Julian Driver and several other philosophers.

Secondly, the NYU seminar on Factually Questionable Discourse has plenty of links to papers on, well, factually defective discourse.

More thoughts of other people on the war. Simon Crean’s address to the nation from last night. I think he’s wrong about what the Americans think of the Australian-American alliance, but otherwise I think everything he says is right. It’s not necessarily the bravest thing in the world to oppose a war supported by a relative handful of people, but I think he is doing the right thing.

The philosophy papers blog is up. Seven new papers, including papers by Elizabeth Harman, Branden Fitselsen, Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, David Deutsch, and Luisa Martí. The Lepore/Ludwig and Martí papers are via Kai von Fintel.

I’ve been rather tardy with this, but congratulations to Laurie and Kieran on their marriage. Kieran is putting more effort into blogging while on holiday in San Francisco (on honeymoon actually) than others might!

A while ago I wrote some comments on Liz Harman’s paper The Potentiality Problem. That paper is now online, and is well worth reading.

I’ve really had nothing to add about the war, but I might pass along things that seem worthwhile. I don’t agree with everything here, but it seems more sensible than a lot of things you’ll see written about the war.

Comments by Ruth Simmons, Brown President, Wednesday March 19

Two nights ago, the President revealed to the world his intention to
invade the nation of Iraq if the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein,
fails to acquiesce to conditions spelled out to avoid imminent attack.
American troops in the region are now in a high state of readiness and
it is expected that, unless Saddam Hussein and his sons step down, the
United States and its allies in this conflict will declare war and move
militarily against the Hussein regime.

A declaration of war is a grave step. Every individual of conscience
and concern will inevitably be praying-up to the moment of military
engagement-for the possibility that conflict and loss of lives can be
avoided. Yet, as much as we pray for peace, we must be prepared for
what could unfold in the days and months ahead if war should come.

Modern means of superpower conflict resolution and warfare can appear
deceptively distant from our lives. The complexity of the issues and
the enigmatic historical and political factors that often generate a
nation’s actions can make it unlikely if not impossible that the
average citizen will feel qualified and empowered to make a judgment or
offer an opinion as to the justness of any declaration of war.
Technological advances in war-making and the removal of conscription as
a means of raising an army might have a tendency to make us feel that
such decisions are far removed from our immediate sphere of concern.
In addition, the deployment of extraordinary force intended to minimize
casualties can suggest that impact will be minimal, and efficiency is
assured. I have heard many declare in recent weeks that, even if such
an action commences, the war will be over swiftly.

If all of this is true-that the issues are far too complex for the non
expert to engage and fully comprehend, that there will be minimal
casualties, and that the war will be over quickly-it still does not
absolve a democratic people from its fundamental responsibilities to
probe rigorously the causes and circumstances of war, to be active in
understanding how the conflict progresses, and to participate in a
process by which our government is continuously informed of the
opinions of the public that it represents. I urge that you not make
this war, however brief, however minimal, however complex, a distant
issue that you perceive at the comfortable periphery of your daily
lives.

There are times in our lives when the discomfort of caring too much is
welcome. I hope that you feel some of that now as our friends and
families face the prospect that their loved ones and friends,
colleagues and acquaintances, may encounter a terrifying choice of
laying down their lives for the country that they love. Some of the
staff at Brown have been called up for active military duty. Many of
the relatives of students, faculty and staff are now on the
battlefront.

I hope you will feel some of that now as we see families hunker down
with deep uncertainty about the present safety and future outlook for
their children. Terror and war acknowledge no innocents or
bystanders. All pay the price.

In the weeks ahead, we will need to pursue every course to understand
better what is taking place. We will need to study this region, as
never before, to understand how we can play a fruitful role in helping
to foster peace and stability there and elsewhere. We will need to be
respectful of the tremendous price being paid daily by American
soldiers and public servants. We will need to resist the temptation to
be bystanders or indifferent observers of these distant, complex events.

In such times as these, each individual must decide how they wish to
respond to events of this magnitude. Some will decide that the best
direction is to conquer fear and to proceed with life, drawing out of
one’s daily experience a fuller measure of what it means to live in
safety and freedom. Some will decide that direct involvement is
required and will participate with others in either supporting or
condemning the war. Still others might decide to focus on the
aftermath of war and on long-term measures for reducing world conflict,
instability and inequality.

Universities have a particularly important role to play in the advent
of war. As in all times, universities must today cling to their
commitment to the dispassionate search for truth. The danger of self
interest overwhelming truth is most acute in these moments. At a time
when we are at risk and fearful of attack, the relentless examination
of the many facets of our intellectual, political and social
perspectives can give way to a more passive role. As scholars, true to
our task, we are morally obligated to continue and strengthen that
examination, bringing to light questions and insights that could be
useful to the nation in the unwinding of war and the restoration of
peace and prosperity. The task of the scholar to probe deeply and the
role of the university to foster edifying debate must be protected
especially in times of war.

Civil discourse, the primary medium for the advancement of this debate
in a healthful context, will be important as we help the nation through
the days ahead. Advocates of war should have their say and so should
the advocates of peace. While the battlefront is understandably not
the site for respectful, orderly exchange, we can cast a vote for
peaceful resolution by maintaining our commitment to orderly debate and
examination in spite of innermost doubt and fear. We will be
establishing forums for discussion, we will be encouraging continued
study throughout this conflict, and we will be emphasizing what is to
be learned in singular moments such as this.

I ask several things of you in this difficult moment. First, that you
take great care in your comings and goings, observing the safety
guidelines placed at your disposal. Second, that you determine to be
resolute in your studies so that you do not squander the tremendous
opportunity you have to develop your intelligence in the service of the
world. Third, that you remember how difficult it is for all those who
do not sleep in safety, eat in abundance, and live in freedom. Fourth,
that you act honorably in this moment and according to the dictates of
your conscience, taking care to respect the right of others to do the
same even if they are diametrically opposed to the part you have
taken. Fifth, that you remember to bring this close to you, taking in
the lessons of war. Finally, I ask that you continue to pray every day
for the safety of all those caught up in this conflict, whether friend
or foe.

We are fortunate to have such a good President.

In other news, I seem to have jinxed Holy Cross. If you want me to do the same thing to your team’s opponents, well I’ll be here all week. Are Cal the highest Leiter ranked team in the tournament? If they get bounced who would take that honour?

UPDATE: Silly question on my part. Pittsburgh are a #2 seed in the tournament, and #5 on Leiter. I guess they’ll retain the honour of being best philosophy school in the tournament for at least a while.

FURTHER UPDATE: Dave Chalmers notes that Arizona are a #1 seed and #8 on Leiter, so their STL (seed times Leiter ranking) of 8 is the lowest of any school. Pitt comes in at 10. If only NYU would spend as much on basketball as on philosophy, I’m sure they could have an STL of 1.

Quick random thoughts while half watching basketball and half working.

Holy Cross is beating Marquette. Amazing!

Chris Bertram links to an explosive email by Alex Miller about the RAE. Part of what Miller says is that journal articles published in journals edited by one’s colleagues should not count as much as other journal articles towards one’s productivity measure. I do hope this idea does not catch hold.

My counterexamples paper got accepted in Phil Studies, and I just got an email about my constructive probability paper saying it is still under consideration. I had pretty much given up on it.

For amusement, check out how many hits Simon Keller has received from being linked on Matthew Yglesias’s weblog. I think Matthew has more readers per day than PPR has subscribers, so you know this is a real new media story.

UPDATE: The quick summary of Miller’s email above is somewhat misleading. Miller makes a number of complaints about Bradford RAE evaluation, and the point about journals edited in-house was a relatively minor complaint in the overall structure of the letter. If you want more detail, well it’s probably best to read what Miller wrote than to read my fairly tendentious summaries. Thanks to Chris Bertram for pointing out that this needed some qualification, though I doubt this goes quite as far as Chris would think appropriate.