Hennessey

My brother Scott is in a band called ‘Hennessey’. (Actually he’s in several bands, and one of them is called ‘Hennessey’.) And that band is currently in an “online band competition”:http://soundcheck.ninemsn.com.au/charts.jsp?fvChart=allbyartist&fvCurPage=9 with the chance of eventually getting a major recording deal. If you click “this link”:http://soundcheck.ninemsn.com.au/charts.jsp?fvChart=allbyartist&fvCurPage=10 you can be taken to the competition webpage where their song is the first one that comes up. If you click on the band’s (not spectacularly rock-star looking) photo a popup window will open that lets you listen to their song ‘Honourman’ and vote for it out of 5. Any votes (even low votes, but we’d much prefer high votes!) would be gratefully appreciated.

They also have another song “Walking to You” in the competition at the bottom of “this page”:http://soundcheck.ninemsn.com.au/charts.jsp?fvChart=allbyartist&fvCurPage=9 which you can also vote for. I get the impression the band likes that song more, and it certainly sounds better to me, but currently the wisdom of crowds suggests “Honourman” is the better song. You can judge for yourself how good each of the songs is, and vote for them separately. Vote early and often.

Closure

I was reading some papers by “Gil Harman”:http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/ while doing some research for a class on chapter 9 of _The Concept of Mind_, and I was struck by this passage in a “very insightful article on Knowledge and Lotteries”:http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Hawthorne.pdf. (The article is co-authored with Brett Sherman.)

bq. A further consequence of denying strong closure principles, according to Hawthorne, is that one must give up at least one of three more restricted closure principles that he thinks would be intuitive even to one who denies the more general closure principles. One of these restricted principles is the Equivalence Principle, according to which, if you know a priori that the propositions that P and that Q are equivalent and you know that P, then you are in a position to know that Q.

bq. However, once it is acknowledged that knowledge can rest on assumptions, the Equivalence Principle has no more intuitive force than more general closure principles. Alice knows this animal is a zebra, on the assumption that it is not a cleverly disguised mule. And the animal’s being a zebra is equivalent to its being a zebra and not a cleverly disguised mule. But, just as she cannot know on the basis of her assumption that her assumption is correct, she is not in a position to know on the basis of that assumption that the animal is a zebra and not a cleverly disguised mule.

Even granting the anti-closure position being adopted by Harman and Sherman, I don’t see how this is a counterexample to the Equivalence Principle that Hawthorne defends. The following two propositions may be _necessarily_ equivalent, but they aren’t _a priori_ equivalent I’d have thought.

(1) That is a zebra.
(2) That is a zebra and not a cleverly disguised mule.

I don’t think it is a priori that no zebras are mules. I could imagine some kind of argument for that conclusion, but there isn’t one in the paper. Of course (1) is a priori equivalent to (3).

(3) That is a zebra and not a cleverly disguised non-zebra.

But I don’t see how one could ever be in a position to know (1) and not in a position to know (3).

Blog Stats for April

Back from Chicago, with only 53 emails that need replies – often substantial replies. And a couple of classes to teach. So little serious blogging. Instead here’s an easy post about blog stats.

Visitors – 20827
Visits – 63582
Hits – 127590

All of those numbers are down from March. Part of that is due to the improved spam protection (37161 blocked attempts to access the site) and in part due to decrease in content quality and/or fewer links from Brian Leiter.

Here are the big draws.

“Break Up Lines”:/archives/000979.html – 1775
“Richard Heck to Brown”:/archives/004304.html – 1632
“Movement at the Station(s)”:/archives/004286.html – 1482
“65536 (or so) Definitions of Physicalism”:/archives/004333.html – 821
“Brian is Very Confused”:/archives/004339.html – 774
“French Military Victories”:/archives/000256.html – 744
“Four Colours?”:/archives/004335.html – 706
“An Argument for Contextualism about Ethics”:/archives/004323.html – 680
“At Least”:/archives/004305.html – 672
“Pragmatics, Belief and Knowledge”:/archives/004282.html – 642
“Be Aware!”:/archives/004303.html – 618
“Lewisiana”:/archives/004273.html – 603

I’ll let you draw your own conclusions about what is and isn’t popular on the blog.

Announcements

I’ll be off in Chicago for the APA Central most of this week, so posting will be light-to-non-existent. I’ll try and get the papers blog updated before I go, but no promises.

One thing that will be going on it when it gets done is the new book by “Robert May”:http://kleene.ss.uci.edu/~rmay/ and Robert Fiengo, “De Lingua Beliefs”:http://kleene.ss.uci.edu/%7Ermay/title.pdf.

bq. The topic of this book is beliefs speakers have about the language they know and use, beliefs that we refer to, as a class, as de lingua beliefs. Of the various de lingua beliefs a speaker may have, we explore those speakers have about the reference and coreference of linguistic expressions. Our interest is drawn to these beliefs because they reflect, in our view, fundamental aspects of our underlying linguistic competence, and how we employ that competence in aid of our communicative ends. Thematically, our inquires are broken into two parts: (i) the nature and genesis of linguistic beliefs, and (ii) the explanatory roles such beliefs play in language use. Exploring (i) takes us to issues of a fundamentally grammatical order, to aspects of linguistic theory wherein we seek descriptions of the resources available to speakers for generating linguistic beliefs. Consideration of (ii) builds on this foundation to the insight that the content of beliefs about the reference of expressions can be taken to be part of what we say by our utterances, a formal part of propositional content. This has direct consequences, explored in detail, for our understanding of the informativeness of identity statements and the failure of substitutions in attributions of propositional attitudes.

Smart Words

I was reading over Jack Smart’s “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism” for 101 tomorrow, and I came across the following wonderful line in the middle of a rousing condemnation of rule utilitarianism.

bq. You might as well say that a person ought to be picked to play for Australia just because all his brothers have been, or that then Australian team should be composed entirely of the Harvey family because this would be better than composing it entirely of any other family.

If only I could write so well. Sadly I fear my students over here won’t get all the references.

By the way, wasn’t Trevor Chappell picked for Australia on just this principle? Maybe some selectors read Smart and missed the intended rhetorical force.

Smart Words

I was reading over Jack Smart’s “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism” for 101 tomorrow, and I came across the following wonderful line in the middle of a rousing condemnation of rule utilitarianism.

bq. You might as well say that a person ought to be picked to play for Australia just because all his brothers have been, or that then Australian team should be composed entirely of the Harvey family because this would be better than composing it entirely of any other family.

If only I could write so well. Sadly I fear my students over here won’t get all the references.

By the way, wasn’t Trevor Chappell picked for Australia on just this principle? Maybe some selectors read Smart and missed the intended rhetorical force.

Brian is Very Confused

So I was reading the Hájek and Pettit paper in “Lewisian Themes”:http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=caoineorg-20&camp=14573&creative=327641&link_code=am1&path=http%3A//www.amazon.com/gp/product/offer-listing/0199274568%3Fcondition%3Dall/ASIN/0199274568 and I was very very confused. This may be a reflection of something wrong with me, or maybe something confusing is going on. (Warning – this is written with effectively _zero_ knowledge of the actual literature, so I might just be reinventing the sled.)
Continue reading

Science and Common Sense

For various reasons I was playing around with ways of summarising what is distinctive about Lewis’s contributions to philosophy, and I thought the following idea sounded interesting. I’m not sure whether it also sounds _true_, but I thought I’d put it forward for consideration.

bq.. One of the signature tasks of philosophy is to figure out the relationship between science and common sense. By ‘common sense’ here we don’t mean platitudes that people utter, as much as the tacit knowledge that lets us navigate the world successfully without sufficient explicit knowledge to pass any given tenth grade science course. Making that tacit knowledge explicit is _one_ of philosophy’s tasks, and one at which Lewis excelled, but perhaps less crucial than relating it to the scientific image. Four options stand out here.

First, we could say that science has shown that common sense is badly wrong, and in need of radical overhaul. This way lies eliminitivism.

Second, we could say that common sense shows that science is either wrong or, at the very least, incomplete. Various forms of dualism and idealism lie this way.

Those two options say there is a tension between science and common sense. The next two options are for reconcilation.

So third, we could say that proper appreciation of science as we find it reveals a place for our common sense concepts. Various forms of naturalism, at least as that term is understood in America, go this way.

Lewis promoted, and to a large extent pioneered, a fourth way. By investigating the structure of common sense closely, we find that it is fit to be reconciled with science, almost any way that science turns out will turn out to be compatible with common sense.

This kind of approach, if it works, allows you to keep two of Lewis’s distinctive attitudes, attitudes he often displayed side by side. First, it’s not an open scientific question whether there are, say, psychological states such as beliefs and desires. Second, philosophy can’t overturn what science shows us. If we go with option three (not to mention option one), there is a danger that science will overturn tacit folk knowledge. That would be bad. If we go with option two, we’ll be using philosophy to overturn science. That would be worse. So option four it is.

The trick then is to make common sense fit for science, roughly however that science turns out to go. Lewis’s strategy here has three parts.

First, show that the ontological and ideological commitments of common sense (or at least the bits of common sense we are committed to keeping) are thin enough that science is guaranteed to meet them.

Second, provide a broadly functional analysis of common sense concepts, passing the question of what realises those functional roles to science. The functional roles are specified in a Wittgensteinian ‘near-enough-is-good-enough’ way, so as to maximise the chance that science will find realisers. (I don’t distinguish here between theories that provide functional definitions of folk terms, theories that provide rigidified functional definitions, and theories that take functional roles to be reference fixers, though that’s something we’d like to know when we do the details.)

Third, provide a broadly subjectivist account of those folk concepts that don’t look like science will find distinctive realisers for them. Lewis’s subjectivism about ethics and contextualism about epistemology fit into this part of the project.

At every stage the devil is in the details, but we can see a way to carry out option four in this outline. A large percentage of Lewis’s work can be seen as carrying out this three-step plan.

p. If this is the right picture in outline, then these paragraphs would be an introduction to a work saying how Lewis carried this off. That work would probably be “book length”:http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=caoineorg-20&camp=14573&creative=327641&link_code=am1&path=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2Fgp%2Fproduct%2Foffer-listing%2F0773529306%3Fcondition%3Dall%2FASIN%2F0773529306, so I won’t try it here. But I wonder what people think of the broad story?

Four Colours?

“Richard Zach reports”:http://www.ucalgary.ca/~rzach/logblog/2005/04/four-color-theorem-verified-in-coq.html that Georges Gonthier has a paper verifying the four colour map theorem. I found this odd, since I thought that “Hud Hudson”:http://www.ac.wwu.edu/%7Earistos/BooksPapers.html had shown that the theorem is not actually true, at least not as typically stated. Hudson’s proof is “here”:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=18&did=358630871&SrchMode=3&sid=1&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1114107341&clientId=8424&aid=1 though that link may not be accessible to everyone.